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ABSTRACT 
The South African credit industry is governed by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA), which 
came into effect on 1st June 2006. This Act was created to bring about efficiency, transparency and 
accessibility to credit, which was not achievable under the predecessor provisions of the Usury Act 
73 of 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. South Africa’s credit history has been riddled 
with discrimination and unfair practices; therefore the NCA is seen as an important regulation in 
attempts to bring stability and equality to the financial sector. All credit providers are governed by 
the NCA and are subjected to strict regulations and compliance in terms of interest rates, fees, 
conduct and disclosure.  
Unsecured credit is one of the credit agreements which is regulated by the NCA. This refers to all 
credit agreements that the credit provider and the consumer has entered into, where there is no 
tangible security offered as recourse for non-payment by the consumer. In statistics produced by the 
National Credit Regulator (NCR), figures showed an astounding growth in unsecured credit. It was 
therefore valuable to investigate the role that the NCA played in the growth of unsecured credit and 
the effect this growth has had on domestic indebtedness and fragility for the South African 
economy. 
Both literature and primary data was drawn on to analyse the research problem. The primary data 
tools consisted of an interview instrument and a questionnaire instrument which was used to glean 
two perspectives on the subject researched. There were 10 interview respondents and 223 
questionnaire respondents that were included in the sample. Interviews consisted of 8 open-ended 
questions which were aimed at respondents that had a good knowledge of the credit industry, the 
NCA and unsecured lending in South Africa. Respondents were categorised according to the sector 
they represented namely banks, regulators and investment companies. The questionnaire 
instrument consisted of 3 sections namely demographic information, knowledge of the NCA and 
debt information, with a total of 34 questions. 
Given the literature on hand, the analysis of both primary data instruments provided results that 
showed that the NCA’s regulations was a key driver in the growth of unsecured credit, alongside 
consumers’ demand. The research also indicated that the incidence of a credit bubble bursting was 
minimal particularly due to the introduction of the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014, 
which closed a few loopholes found in the NCA. A further inference that could be drawn is that 
banks have adequate credit assessment criteria and systems in place and are therefore in a position 
to profile consumers correctly. Consumers, it was found, are knowledgeable on credit related 
matters and in addition to this; there are many initiatives, by both banks and the government, for 
consumer credit education. Overall banks did comply with the NCA’s regulations; however, it was 
found that it was the NCA’s regulations that had effects on domestic indebtedness and by extension, 
the fragility on the economy. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1. Current situation in South Africa 
In the quarterly consumer credit market report (CCMR) published by the NCR, statistics showed that 
unsecured credit had risen from R7.6 billion in June 2008 to R21.6 billion for the year ended 
December 2013. The rise in unsecured credit has been a hotly debated topic as it is regarded as an 
early signal in the formation of a credit bubble in the macro-economy. Literature and history has 
shown that periods of strong credit growth have often been followed by a credit recession or crisis. 
For example, during the 2006 to 2008 period, banks lent mortgages relentlessly but just a few years 
later (2009-2011); they were still recovering from the financial crash and became very conservative 
in their lending. In the recent years, unsecured credit in South Africa (SA) has seen a tremendous 
growth spurt, with the largest lenders being African Bank and Capitec Bank (Reuters, 2012). Since 
then, the big four banks, who were previously scorched in the mortgage market, resolved to get a 
share of the unsecured credit market and consequently became very aggressive, seeing the 
attractiveness of the product.  
Compliance & Risk Resources Pty Ltd (2012) investigated the increase of unsecured personal loans in 
South Africa’s credit market. It was established that the attractiveness of secured lending, for 
example mortgage loans, had reduced significantly in the recent years due to structural factors, 
while the increase in unsecured lending has largely been due to the sizable returns credit providers 
receive from this product. It was also claimed that most unsecured loans are written at very high 
interest rates, typically for higher risk customers and should the high growth trend continue over an 
extended period of time, consumer credit health will be negatively impacted.  
Prior to the introduction of the NCA, South African consumers were governed by both the Usury Act 
73 of 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. Most consumers had insufficient, if any, 
access to credit, and relied on other non-conventional ways of obtaining finance. This 
unconventional market was dominated by micro lenders, which are organisations that make loans to 
individuals who are not able to obtain financing from traditional lenders. These microlenders 
predominantly granted loans to lower income earners, who found it difficult to gain access to credit 
from formal and more traditional financial institutions, namely banks. These consumers were 
charged higher interest rates than would have been charged by traditional financiers. This scenario 
contributed to micro lenders earning their reputation of being unscrupulous. Given that a large 
percentage of South Africans are low and middle income earners, their only source of credit was 
through the utilisation of microlenders. These microlenders soon realised this was a lucrative 
business and exploited consumers to the fullest, at times even becoming violent. The NCA has 
effectively put a stop to this exploitation by firstly, making credit more accessible to consumers and 
secondly, by regulating the maximum interest rates that can be charged for these loans.  
1.2. Overview of the National Credit Act 
The NCA was introduced to South Africa in 2006. This act repealed both the Usury Act and the Credit 
Agreements Act, which governed credit agreements up until that time. The NCA’s most important 
objective was to level the playing field amongst credit providers and consumers in SA. It brought into 
existence a number of basic rights to consumers and governed the way in which credit providers are 
allowed to do business with consumers. In addition to this, the NCA governs the way consumers are 
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treated when applying for credit, during the term of the contract and, most importantly, to attempt 
to discourage conduct that would lead to over indebtedness. The responsibility lay in the hands of 
the credit provider to ensure that they do not lend recklessly and if found to be lending recklessly, 
would be seen to be in contravention of the act and liable to stiff fines and other penalties.  
Unsecured credit is defined as smaller money loans (micro loans) re-payable in instalments, where 
the lender is given no assurance in any tangible form for repayment of the debt, which includes 
personal loans. This refers to all agreements greater than R8000 and/or repayable over more than 6 
months. The maximum interest rate that can be charged under these kinds of agreements is linked 
to the South African Reserve Bank repurchase (repo) rate (6.5% as at 7 May 2014). This maximum 
rate is calculated as follows: (repo rate x 2.2) + 20% per annum, which means the current maximum 
rate that can be levied on unsecured credit agreements is 34.3% (as at 7 May 2014).  
If the comparison is made with the interest rate that can be charged on unsecured credit 
agreements with the interest rate that can be charged on other credit agreements, it can clearly be 
seen that unsecured credit products are highly profitable. The growth in unsecured credit, as per 
figures published in the CCMR, has been at a phenomenal rate, which attests to the fact that the 
unsecured credit business is extremely lucrative for credit providers. 
Terrones (2004) claimed that credit booms have five common characteristics, one being that they 
are often associated with banking and currency crises1. The analysis also concluded that credit 
booms follow a cyclical pattern, upward then downward economic activities for the country in 
question, indicating at worst, a recession. Although the study did not include SA as one of the 
emerging market economies, comparisons can be made with other emerging market economies. In a 
study of advanced economies, two key facts of modern business cycle was documented: financial-
crisis recessions are more costly than normal recessions in terms of output; and for both types of 
recessions, more credit-intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower 
recoveries (Jorda et al, 2010). Literature therefore shows that countries that experience high credit 
growth will eventually experience the consequences of a recession or other economic crisis. 
1.3  Problem Statement 
The NCA was promulgated in order to foster stability in the credit lending arena with the specific 
purpose of bringing about fair and transparent credit lending practices to both consumers and credit 
providers. An objective of the NCA is to curb reckless lending by credit providers and achieve 
integrity in the credit market. The onus is therefore on the credit provider to assess credit 
applications to ensure that consumers are not over indebted and can indeed take on additional 
debt. The credit provider needs to perform vetting of applications for credit, within reasonable 
measures, and take all pertinent information into account prior to lending to a consumer. In 
accordance with the NCA, a credit provider needs to access the consumer’s debt repayment history; 
existing financial means; prospects and obligations; his/her understanding of the risks and costs of 
the proposed credit and his/her rights and obligations under a proposed credit agreement before 
entering into a credit agreement with the consumer. A credit agreement will be deemed reckless in 
                                                          
1 The other characteristics that are common in emerging markets are that credit booms are much less common than 
episodes of rapid credit growth; they are synchronized across countries; they are somewhat asymmetric and there is 
almost a 70 percent probability that a credit boom coincides with either a consumption or investment boom, however the 
probability that a credit boom coincides with an output boom is less than 50 percent (Terrones, 2004). 
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terms of the NCA if the credit provider fails to conduct this assessment, irrespective of what the 
outcome of the assessment would have been. 
Another key objective of the NCA is to make credit assessable to all consumers in order for them to 
buy wealth generating assets and not just the traditional furniture accounts. Prior to the NCA, the 
majority of South African consumers had very little access to credit, be it mortgages or unsecured 
credit. Feasibility (2009) noted that the distribution of credit still largely excluded the lower income 
bands of the population, which signified little potential for asset growth. The NCA has made it 
possible for more South Africans to legally access credit and start accumulating wealth. Furthermore 
the NCA was established to remove prejudices, biased practices and unsuitable disclosures in the 
market. 
The increase in growth of unsecured credit is both a factor of demand and supply. From a 
consumers’ perspective, unsecured lending is the quickest way in which to obtain credit, when 
compared to vehicle or mortgage finance, which requires valuations and other essential criteria to 
be finalised prior to approval and payout of the loan. This speediness does not come cheap though, 
since the interest rate on an unsecured loan contract can be as high as 30% per annum, when 
compared to a mortgage loan, which is, more often than not, very close to the prime interest rate. 
From a banks’ perspective, the greatest attraction of the unsecured loan product is the high returns 
received over the term of the loan which can now be extended to as long as 84 months. The credit 
provider is compensated for the riskiness of these loans and is able to negate this risk by pricing 
accordingly, provided it falls within the pricing ambit of the NCA. Feasibility (2009) found that the 
NCA has had the biggest impact on pricing of unsecured loans. Previously, under the Usury Act, loans 
of up to R10000 were charged at a rate of 30% per month, which equates to 360% per annum. The 
NCA reduced this by more than 330% to approximately 30% per annum, depending on the repo rate.  
By definition, a credit bubble forms when consumers build up debt to a point where they cannot 
make repayments. From this definition, it can be deducted that should the growth in unsecured 
credit continue to increase at its current rate, the South African economy will have a crisis brewing. 
Once consumers become over indebted, they start missing payments, which leads to a bad credit 
record and future credit extension opportunities diminish rapidly. Banks suffer from bad unsecured 
loans since they have no security to fall back on when default occurs, and these debts are 
subsequently written off, lowering profit margins for banks. Once this occurs, banks begin to adopt a 
conservative credit granting approach, lending only to credit worthy clients, with the requirement of 
security in the form of a deposit, surety, or an asset, as a cushion. This would leave most average 
South Africans without hope, particularly if they relied on credit to fund daily consumption as well as 
luxury items.  
On the one hand, SAPA (2013) claimed that there is no credit bubble evolving in SA. The study 
reported findings by Roelof Botha and Ilsa Botha on how the increase in unsecured credit growth has 
helped SA recover from the recent global recession and was used for economic growth. However, 
van Onselen (2012a) suggested that there is a credit bubble forming in SA since the rate of growth in 
unsecured credit has risen to unprecedented levels which SA consumers cannot sustain. He explains 
the consequences of a credit bubble on SA’s economy and questions whether the NCA, in fact, 
facilitated the evolving bubble scenario or could have done more to curb banks’ lending at such high 
rates. 
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The National Credit Regulator (2012) highlighted the following undesirable practices brought to the 
attention of the NCR, in light of the increase in the granting of unsecured credit by credit providers 
to consumers: 
1. High risk consumers are denied secured credit, yet sold unsecured credit by the same credit 
provider. Credit providers then earn higher returns, while doing less work in terms of unsecured 
transactions. Although this does not imply contravention of the NCA, the ethics are questioned. 
2. Credit providers are offering consumers repeated disbursements of personal loans and charging 
an initiation fee on each disbursement, not on just the initial disbursement. In addition to this, 
minimal credit vetting is done at the further disbursement stage and thus leaving consumers 
with higher debt levels. 
3. Overselling and incorrect contracting of credit insurance which provides very little protection to 
the consumer and his/her family. 
The question then is whether the NCA has assisted in forestalling a credit bubble from developing or 
has, in fact, inadvertently aided the banks in forming this likely evolving bubble? Maya Fisher (2012) 
writes, “Ironically it was the National Credit Act that allowed banks to enter into microlending by 
setting rules such as how much could be charged for interest rates and administration costs. This 
effectively legitimised microlending and allowed banks to move into this lucrative industry”. Before 
proceeding further, be aware that the theoretical underpinning of this research is the nexus 
between pro-cyclicality of credit extension and financial system fragility. This theoretical envelope is 
more elaborately laid out in the literature review chapter. 
1.4  Objective 
The purpose of this study is therefore to ascertain whether the NCA assisted banks in forestalling a 
credit bubble from forming in South Africa, or whether in fact it inadvertently aided the likelihood of 
financial fragility. The study will investigate the reasons behind the huge increase in the growth of 
unsecured credit as opposed to other forms of credit, why banks prefer this product relative to 
others in its asset portfolio and whether proper credit assessments are completed by banks prior to 
lending this product to minimise the risk of engaging in reckless lending.  
1.5 Overview of the methodology 
This study is designed to investigate whether the NCA has had an effect on banks with regards to 
their issuance of unsecured credit and/or whether the NCA has inadvertently aided the formation of 
an evolving credit bubble in South Africa. The study examines whether banks are conducting 
appropriate or sufficient credit vetting assessments prior to approving loans to consumers, 
specifically with regards to personal loans which form part of the unsecured credit product.  
Both primary data and systematic review of literature was used to ascertain the empirical evidence 
on the suspicion that the NCA may have contributed to the acceleration in the formation of a credit 
bubble in South Africa. Interviews with banking officials from the following institutions: Absa Bank, 
First National Bank, Standard Bank, Nedbank, the NCR and various investment companies were 
conducted. The focus of the interview was on the levels of unsecured credit in SA and their views on 
the consequences thereof. It also included questions on credit vetting, responsible lending or the 
lack thereof and educational initiatives. 
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The questions focused on the following themes: 
1. Drivers of unsecured credit in SA, 
2. Credit assessment systems, and 
3. Responsible lending or its lack. 
In addition to the interviews, questionnaires were developed that were sent to at least 100 
consumers with the hope of gathering information pertaining to the following issues: 
1. Number of credit agreements they have entered into, 
2. Amounts of unsecured debt and secured debt contacts they hold, 
3. Knowledge on the NCA, and 
4. Solicitations received via email, sms and telephone. 
The researcher ensured that the questionnaire was distributed to all demographics (i.e. races 
groups, different age categories, both genders and different income categories) to ensure a diverse 
sample was obtained. This was used to assess the current state of knowledge by consumers and for 
information on the current financial situation of consumers.  
Literature on the subject played an integral role in assessing the current state of affairs, particularly 
in better guiding this study, as a number of studies conducted on the research of the growth in 
unsecured lending in South Africa have been found. 
1.6 Summary of findings 
The research report investigated whether banks adhere to regulations imposed by the NCA and 
whether the adherence or non-adherence to the NCA has inadvertently aided the formation of a 
credit bubble in SA. By using both literature on the subject and primary data from interviews and 
questionnaires, it was found that the perception amongst scholars and respondents was that one of 
the main drivers in the growth of unsecured credit and hence the possibility of a credit bubble 
erupting was due to certain regulations imposed by the NCA. Notwithstanding other drivers of the 
growth of unsecured credit, the maximum interest rates and fees suggested by the NCA convinced 
banks, who are the largest of all credit providers in terms of disbursements that unsecured credit 
was more profitable and easier to execute than other credit products. The report also confirmed 
that banks generally conduct adequate credit assessments and generally have conservative credit 
granting systems. Banks, in part or whole, adhere to regulations set out by the NCA but the general 
consensus was that the NCA itself need to be re-evaluated. The National Credit Amendment Act 19 
of 2014 was positively accepted by banks and other concerned parties as it addressed some flaws in 
the NCA. 
1.7 Outline of the Research Report 
The remainder of the research report will take the following form.  
Chapter 2 contains a literature review including a review of credit booms and the consequences 
thereof, financial liberalisation and the current state of affairs in SA. It also includes the theoretical 
aspects of the NCA, unsecured credit agreements and credit regulation in SA. This also highlights the 
theoretical background to the study. 
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Chapter 3 narrows down key research questions that addresses the research objectives identified. 
Chapter 4 of the paper describes the methodology used in the analysis. It includes detailed 
information around the research population, sample selection, profile of respondents, measuring 
instruments and methods applied. In addition to this, limitations of the study and any ethical 
considerations that arose were highlighted. 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis and flags the main findings and results based on the questions 
identified in chapter 3 and is devoted to the impact assessment of the NCA and unsecured lending in 
SA. In this chapter both the interview and questionnaire instruments results are presented and 
discussed according to the observations gleaned from the findings. 
Chapter 6 concludes the research with suggestions and recommendations based on the research 
questions and results from the data analysis performed. It also includes suggestions for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature review 
This chapter provides a more deepened understanding of banking crises and the possible reasons as 
to why they occur in both developed and developing economies. It includes conclusions drawn from 
research conducted on financial liberalisation, which can possibly lead to fragility in the banking 
sector and the economy as a whole. The chapter begins with explaining the consequences of credit 
booms and banking crises and then proceeds to provide a more in depth view on the South African 
credit market. The NCA is then expounded on, with particular attention given to unsecured lending 
market and the growth thereof. Reckless lending and over-indebtedness is defined and 
contextualised, with reference to the NCA and the South African consumer. Finally the chapter 
concludes with the debt credit provisioning review process adopted in the South African market. 
2.1  Credit booms and their consequences  
A lending boom is defined as two consecutive periods in which the ratio of nominal private credit to 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) deviates from the trend by a certain threshold. This threshold 
varies from 2 to 10 percentage points from GDP (Ottens et al, 2005). Although credit booms 
indicated strong economic growth, Ottens et al (2005), suggested that excessive growth in credit 
also significantly increased the likelihood of banking crises, specifically in emerging market 
economies. This view was shared by Terrones (2004), who stated that there was a difference 
between financial deepening and excessive credit expansion. Financial deepening is defined as credit 
growing faster than GDP whereas credit expansion was a moderate growth in credit, lower than that 
of GDP. It was this excessive credit expansion, particularly in emerging markets, that usually became 
unsustainable and eventually lead to the demise and collapse of the credit sector. Terrones (2004) 
concluded that booms are very cyclical in nature, where during up-swings, banks tend to extend 
credit on very favourable terms and during the period thereafter, referred to as down-swings, credit 
terms became stricter, leading to a decrease in both economic activity and private consumption2.  
The role of banks was to create credit by borrowing short and lending long (De Grauwe, 2008). This 
action creates a liquidity risk for banks and, thus could create a crisis should banks not be able to 
satisfy reverse deposit demands within a short period of time. A banking sector with a strong 
balance sheet is considered to be healthy. This trait was not only desirable for financial stability and 
credit growth but essential in the prevention or reduction of the severity of a banking crisis 
(Terrones, 2004). An economy that is considered healthy and lively is one that is able to move funds 
from savings to productive investment options. This process is hindered when a financial crisis 
occurs, whereby the economy is driven away from its equilibrium of high output to one of declining 
output and lost investment opportunities (Madubeko, 2010). Banking crises are more severe in 
emerging markets as they disrupt flow of funds to those dependent on it (Joyce, 2009). An event 
during which a country’s banking sector experiences bank runs, sharp increases in default rates 
accompanied by large losses of capital that results in public intervention, bankruptcy or the forced 
merger of major financial institutions is known as a financial crisis (Jorda et al, 2010). Systemic bank 
crises break out due to credit intensive booms and bring forth deep and long-lasting recessions 
                                                          
2Other conclusions derived from the study include: credit booms are associated with a rapid increase, and subsequent fall, 
in the price of non-tradable relative to tradable, consistent with the predictions of the literature surveyed; credit booms 
are accompanied by an increase in real stock prices and a subsequent dramatic drop; credit booms do not have a major 
effect on inflation, partly reflecting the high degree of trade openness of these economies; and lastly banks expand credit 
to the private sector by changing the composition of their assets and by increasing their external borrowing. 
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(Boissay et al, 2013). The larger the credit boom, (i) the higher the probability of a systemic banking 
crisis, (ii) the sooner the systemic banking crisis, and (iii) once the systemic banking crisis breaks out 
– the deeper and longer the recession. 
The two documented stylised facts about the modern business cycle is that financial crisis recessions 
are more devastating than normal recessions and that the credit intensity of the expansion phase is 
closely associated with the severity of the recession phase for both types of recessions. Normal 
recessions are defined as two consecutive periods of decreased growth in GDP (Jorda et al, 2011). In 
other words, for a financial recession, in particular, the greater the drive by banks to extend credit, 
i.e. financial leverage, the more serious the consequences of the recession and the longer the 
economy will take to recover from the recession. This increased financial leverage raises the 
vulnerability of an economy to shocks.  
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) stated that among the causes of banking crises in emerging market 
economies was rapid domestic growth, large bank liabilities relative to reserves and deposit rate 
decontrol. Joyce (2009) included asset price declines, rapid increase in domestic credit and fiscal 
imbalances also as signs of a banking crisis. Financial globalisation multiplied the likelihood of 
banking crises or its severity. The monitoring of borrowers became more difficult when the volume 
of lending rose rapidly, hence the quality of loans declined. Rapid credit growth can trigger banking 
sector distress through two channels namely, macroeconomic imbalances and deterioration of loan 
capacity (Duenwald et al, 2005). Latter (1997) listed the causes of banking crises under the following 
headings, macroeconomic instability; poor strategies; weak management; inadequate control 
systems, operational failures and fraud.  
After the 1930’s banking crisis, the following three reforms were developed (De Grauwe, 2008): 
• The central bank took responsibility of lender-of-last resort, 
• Deposit insurance mechanisms were put into place, 
• Prevention of commercial banks from taking on too many risks. 
Although these reforms were put in place to prevent future crises from occurring, bankers relied on 
insurance by the central banks and governments in the form of lender-of-last resort and deposit 
insurance as a basis to take on further risk. Poor credit assessment was listed as one of the more 
common operational failures within a bank that could lead to a banking crisis3 (Latter, 1997). 
Adverse credit selection occurred where banks tended to lend to credit unworthy consumers due to 
poor judgment and information asymmetries prevalent. This led to loans going bad more quickly 
than if proper credit assessment criteria were in place. Banks are attuned as intermediaries to deal 
with the problems associated with asymmetric information in the financial sector. Since banks did 
not have to share information, they have an incentive to spend resources on obtaining information 
which they can use in providing loans and setting interest rates, which allowed consumers to obtain 
finance at terms they deem reasonable. Banks can also monitor compliance with the conditions of a 
loan agreement (Joyce, 2009). Duenwald et al (2005) found that there was a swing from short term 
                                                          
3Other common operational failures as found by Latter (1997:25) include interest rate or exchange rate exposures; 
concentration of lending and connected lending; new areas of activity; unauthorised trading or position taking, associated 
with a failure of internal controls and other operational failures. 
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loans to medium and long term loans, which was a characteristic of a credit boom. This was labelled 
as a trait of an increase in confidence of both creditors and debtors.  
Madubeko (2010) found that South Africa’s policies such as exchange controls, interest rate policy 
and the National Credit Act insulated the country from the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, but only 
to an extent. The vulnerabilities soon surfaced after the crisis struck, which included the high rate of 
unemployment, high household debt ratios and the current account deficit.  
In contrast to most literature, Sopanha SA (2006) established that only between 6-20% of credit 
booms in transition economies, of which SA was included, resulted in a crisis. Although divergent, 
the conclusions drawn still maintain the fact that credit booms usually precede a financial crisis, 
particularly for emerging market economies and to a lesser extent, advanced economies. From the 
conclusions drawn by these authors  one can assume that excessive credit growth, more often than 
not, resulted in a crisis or in a recession, all dependent on the level of financial leverage. 
2.2 Financial Liberalisation 
For a variety of reasons, banking systems have developed in different ways among countries, but the 
trend has been towards an increasingly liberal stance by the authorities with regards to allowing 
banks to diversify their activities (Latter, 1997). Financial liberalisation often leads to financial crises 
– the link has usually been due to poorly-designed banking systems (Daniel and Jones, 2006). In the 
same study the results stated that even if the emerging economy has a well-designed banking 
system, after the period of low risk growth, the economy enters a period with an elevated risk of 
banking crises. For financial liberalisation to have predominantly positive effects, it must be 
accompanied by reliable institutional infrastructure, the proper conduct of monetary and fiscal 
policies, a reduction in corruption, and an increase in transparency and vigilant prudential 
supervision (Chauhan, 2012). Financial liberalisation is explained as all policies aimed at freeing 
“repressed” economies from the effects of growth-retarding policies such as low and often negative 
real interest rates and directed credit policies (Fowowe, 2008). Fowowe (2008) explained further 
that financial liberalisation included interest rate liberalisation, abolition of directed credit 
allocation, bank denationalisation, liberalising entry into the banking sector and strengthening of 
prudential regulation. Interest rate liberalisation was supplemented by the following changes: 
central banks were made more independent; reserve requirements and directed credit was eased; 
capital accounts were liberalised (foreigners were allowed to participate in capital markets); markets 
were set up for central bank debt and government debt; and state banks were privatised (The World 
Bank, 2005). 
Before liberalisation, South Africa was a typically repressed country characterised by interest rate 
controls, direct controls, exchange controls and other forms of financial repression. A number of 
these controls have been lifted as the country went further towards full financial liberalisation 
(Sibanda, 2012). Sibanda (2012) also indicated that there are two conflicting views on the financial 
liberalisation-growth nexus. From one perspective, financial liberalisation lead to a more efficient 
credit distribution thus increased investment and economic growth, while on the other hand a 
negative relationship was found between openness and growth due to excessive risk-taking 
behaviour which increased economic volatility and therefore increased the chance of a financial 
crisis from occurring. Due to the low rates of economic growth experienced in these countries, the 
economic performances of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have attracted significant attention 
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in recent years. The unsatisfactory growth in these countries was due to financial repression, which 
included interest rate ceilings which kept rates low and discouraged savings and thus investments. 
The effects of financial liberalisation were meant to free these countries and therefore allow growth 
(Fowowe, 2008). 
Factors that provided the motivation for the move to financial liberalization were (The World Bank, 
2005): 
• Poor results, 
• High costs, and 
• Pressures from globalisation. 
All three factors reflected on the urgent need to move toward financial liberalisation since the 
economies had little, if any, growth, no investments or savings, weak banking systems and the need 
to increase access to international financial markets. 
Sibanda (2012) compiled the table below to summarise the main changes in the key dimensions of 
financial liberalisation for South Africa. 
Table 1: Summary of the financial liberalisation process in South Africa 
Credit Control Interest Rates Entry Barriers Exchange 
Control 
Reserve 
Requirements 
Credit ceilings 
effected in 
1965. 
Removed in 
1980. 
Interest rate 
controls 
removed in 
1980, 
replacement in 
March 1998 of 
bank rate with a 
more market 
related 
repurchase 
rate. 
Enhanced market entry 
(with permission in 1995 
to foreign banks to open 
branches in South Africa); 
some new banks 
permitted after 1983; 50 
new banks since 1990, 
development of new 
markets and further 
development of market 
for financial derivative; 
introduction/development 
of new financial 
instruments (e.g. 
commercial paper, equity 
options and futures 
contracts); continuous 
deregulation of the 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. 
Capital controls 
tightened in 
1985, exchange 
controls on 
non-residents 
eliminated in 
1995. Controls 
on residents 
relaxed in 
1997. 
Cash and 
liquidity 
requirements 
lowered in 1980. 
Source: Sibanda(2012) 
Sibanda (2012) and Chauhan (2012) concurred that financial liberalisation brought benefits to an 
economy in the form of growth and expansion but it needed to be implemented within a proper 
regulatory framework and legal structures in order for the country to reap those benefits. If 
challenges were not overcome, the economy will be more susceptible to financial crises. Chauhan 
(2012) specified that banks needed to be regulated due to a variety of financial crises and periods of 
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instability. In order to maintain public confidence (and reduce bank runs), banks needed to be 
regulated. This regulation also prevented banks from taking the types of risks that caused economic 
instability. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) found that moral hazard was problematic in 
liberalised financial systems, where huge risk-taking possibilities were at hand. They pointed out that 
in countries with weaker institutions, moral hazard problems was also greater because in these 
countries it was more difficult to supervise and control risk-taking activities by banks. 
2.3 The South African Credit Market 
South Africa is the economic powerhouse of Africa, leading the continent in industrial output and 
mineral production and generating a large proportion of the continents’ electricity. The country has 
abundant natural resources, well developed financial, legal, communication, energy and transport 
sectors, a stock exchange which ranks among the top 20 in the world, and a modern infrastructure 
supporting efficient distribution of goods throughout the southern African region. In addition to the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE), South Africa has a well-regulated banking sector, with the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) remaining independent (Madubeko, 2010). Deloitte (2012) stated 
that South Africa has one of the most sophisticated and sound banking and financial services sectors 
in the world. 
South Africa’s history was one of racial segregation brought about by the apartheid system which is 
defined as “the state of being apart” between race groups. Due to the injustice prevalent in South 
Africa, the international community sanctioned South Africa’s trade and investment into or out of 
the country. In 2004 South Africa held its first democratic election which had the effects of 
eradicating its racially prejudiced history and thereby allowing sanctions against it to be lifted. Due 
to the legacy of apartheid, many South Africans, predominantly blacks, were left with little, if any, 
access to credit markets. These South Africans relied on income earned from employment and the 
use of micro lenders, more commonly known as loan sharks, to supplement any deficits in income.  
The pioneers in modern South African microfinance date back to the 1980’s (Porteous and 
Hazelhurst, 2004). This excluded loan sharks, who have been around much longer. Commercial 
lenders emerged later, sensing an opportunity in the market which surfaced after 2004, when many 
unbanked South Africans entered the credit market.  
Prior to the introduction of the National Credit Act, the two collection techniques lenders utilised 
were: 
• Cash lending: cash lenders withheld the consumers debit cards and pin numbers. This 
allowed lenders access to the consumers’ bank accounts via automatic teller machine (ATM) 
withdrawals. 
• Payroll deduction: the employers of consumers granted access to lenders for deductions of 
instalments directly from the salaries of consumers. 
Both these collection techniques allowed lenders to take full advantage of the growing credit market 
by granting risk free loans to any consumer, whether they needed it or not. These lenders were 
guaranteed payment via the collection techniques described and therefore paid almost no attention 
to the consumers’ financial state of affairs. This coupled with the interest rates allowed under the 
Usury Act 73 of 1968, made credit extension a highly appealing business. 
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Although there was a legitimate body to which micro lenders could belong, the Micro Finance South 
Africa (MFSA), Devnomics (2012) indicated that the activity of “loan sharking” still existed. This was 
mostly found in South African townships where predominantly lower income groups live. They still 
practised in a manner outlawed by the NCA, by withholding ATM cards and only handing them back 
after pay day, once they had collected their portion. Violence was very much a part of the collection 
methods and the interest charged was exorbitant. Although there was an increase in formal financial 
institutions and bank products, some individuals continued to utilise informal products such as a 
savings club or private money lenders. These sources were most often used for short slumps in 
income and when finance was needed quickly in order to fulfil an obligation. These sources, 
especially private lenders like loan sharks, were particularly expensive but individuals felt that they 
had no other choice (Finmark Trust, 2012). 
The Micro Finance Regulatory Council’s (MFRC) sole purpose was to improve consumer protection 
but this did not prove to be effective. With the consumer in mind, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and the MFRC reviewed consumer credit regulations in SA and put forth the National 
Credit Act (NCA). The primary purpose of the Act was to achieve integrity in the credit market and 
remove the multitude of unfair practices, inappropriate disclosures and anti-competitive practices 
from the market. Another vital goal of the Act was that it put the onus on lenders to assess the 
borrowing capacity of a consumer before granting a loan in order to ensure that the consumers’ 
credit levels were sustainable. 
In general, consumers are protected by 3 types of regulations, which certain countries within 
developed financial sectors utilise. Parts of these regulations were included in the NCA in some form 
or the other (Goodwin-Groen and Kelly-Louw, 2006).These regulations are divided into the following 
3 pillars: 
Pillar 1 This pillar was implemented by the Swiss Bundesgesetz Uber den 
Konsumentenkredit. This pillar states that lenders should keep within consumers 
borrowing capacity where their disposable income should be enough to repay all 
loans within 36 months. Similarly the NCA required a lender to conduct credit 
assessments of a consumers’ ability to pay and requires full financial disclosure by 
consumers upon application for credit. 
Pillar 2 Lenders were obligated to disclose, in plain language, all costs associated with a 
credit product. The European Union and United States have implemented this 
regulation. Directives 87/102/EC and 98/7/EC of the European parliament and of the 
Council introduced a specified method of calculating the “annual percentage rate of 
charge” (APRC). This method stated the equivalence of loans on the one hand and 
repayments and charges on the other. The annual percentage rate thus had to 
include all charges to the consumer, meaning all costs of the credit including interest 
and other charges that are directly connected with the credit agreement. 
Furthermore, any advertisement or offer displayed in the business premises in which 
a credit agreement or the arrangement of a credit agreement was offered and which 
included a rate of interest or any figures relating to the cost of the credit, must also 
include a statement of APRC.  The NCA required comprehensive disclosure of all 
interest and other fees and charges payable on the principal debt in percentage and 
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rand value, together with a repayment schedule in the form of a pre-agreement 
statement and quotation so that the client has time to think about it before 
committing to the loan (section 92 of the Act read with regulations 28 and 29). 
Furthermore the NCA has strict disclosure provisions, depending on the type of 
advertisement, which must be complied with.  
Pillar 3 This pillar was the regulation in terms of interest rate caps. The NCA included 
maximum rates of interest applicable to seven different types of credit. These were 
effectively the usury limits.  
In the quarterly publication issued by the NCR, the CCMR indicated that total credit granted in South 
Africa during quarter one of 2008 was R80.7 million while total credit granted during quarter four of 
2013 was R118.6 million, a 46.9% increase. For more related statistics, see Figure 1 and Table 2 
below, which are discussed further in the following paragraph. 
Figure 1: Total credit granted in South Africa from Q4 2007 to Q4 2013 
 
Source: CCMR statistics issued by NCR 
The CCMR splits each credit type by size of agreement, granted by level of income and indicated the 
age analysis of the gross debtors’ book. In addition to total credit granted, the report also provided 
the split between credit providers and types of credit agreements. From quarter one of 2008 to 
quarter four of 2013, banks continued to grant more than 80% of the total credit granted to 
consumers. The remainder was split between non-bank vehicle financiers, retailers and other credit 
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providers, although none very significant. The table below indicates the distribution of credit 
agreements for each fourth quarter from 2008 to 2013. 
Table 2: Distribution of Credit granted by credit agreement 
Agreement Q4 2008 Q4 2009 Q4 2010 Q4 2011 Q4 2012 Q4 2013 
Mortgages 41.34% 33.31% 32.17% 27.24% 23.85% 29.26% 
Secured Credit 33.97% 37.39% 33.66% 31.03% 32.92% 34.20% 
Credit Facilities 11.00% 10.92% 12.27% 15.42% 15.99% 15.76% 
Unsecured 
Credit 
12.12% 16.65% 20.15% 24.58% 24.24% 18.22% 
Short term 
Credit 
1.57% 1.74% 1.75% 1.72% 1.42% 1.16% 
Developmental 
credit 
0% 0% 0% 0% 1.58% 1.41% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: CCMR statistics issued by the NCR 
Note that in 2012 the NCR had expanded on the number of credit providers whose figures were 
incorporated into the production and publication of the CCMR. This incorporation was effective from 
the fourth quarter of 2012 and had not been applied retrospectively. Developmental credit had also 
been introduced for the first time in the quarter four of 2012 edition of the CCMR. That inclusion has 
influenced the trends in all categories of credit for both “total credit granted” and the “gross 
debtors’ book” and was more evident on the unsecured and short term credit categories. 
Credit touches the lives of millions of South Africans, with many dependent on it for their very 
survival. It not only has the potential to create opportunities for individuals to access goods and 
services, start businesses, obtain education or improve living standards, but also served as a shock-
absorber during periods of financial hardship. Although credit can have positive implications for the 
person accessing it, it can also destroy a person’s financial security, hence the need for caution 
especially in circumstances where there was no access obtained before. 
2.4  Unsecured credit in South Africa 
In a study of household debt, wealth and saving, Prinsloo (2002) identified the micro finance 
industry as a factor that influenced household debt since the beginning of the 1990’s. He confirmed 
that this industry played a major part in extending credit to the low income households and had 
been partly responsible for the growing concerns about the levels of indebtedness of the household 
sector. Post introduction of the NCA, not much has changed, except that micro lenders were no 
longer the only players in the unsecured credit arena. SA’s debt to income ratio rose from below 
40% in the 1980’s to around 80% in 2014 (Fakir, 2014).The author went on to explain the concern 
expressed when the savings rate in SA was taken into consideration, which was by far the lowest 
when compared to SA’s peers in other emerging markets. 
Table 2 above showed the increasing growth in unsecured credit from 2008 to 2012. This supported 
literature around the topic of the growth in unsecured credit which indicated that in 2011 and 2012, 
the levels of unsecured levels peaked in South Africa, making it a cause for concern by the NCR, 
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SARB and investors. Since banks granted the majority of created credit to consumers, it was safe to 
assume that unsecured personal loans were largely granted by banks.  
As defined by the NCA 34 of 2005, unsecured credit agreements are those agreements with a tenor 
of more than 6 months and/or an amount of more than R8000, without tangible security provided to 
the lender as a resort to, should the borrower be in a position where he/she was unable to pay for 
the loan. This definition highlighted the fact that the major difference between unsecured and 
secured lending was the fact that when an unsecured loan was granted, the lender had no recourse 
to the consumer should he default. The lender should therefore be compensated for the additional 
risk with this type of agreement as opposed to mortgage or vehicle finance where the financial asset 
can be sold to recover any outstanding debt, should the borrow default.  
The NCA’s stipulated that the maximum interest rate applicable to unsecured credit is 20% + 
2.2xrepo rate. When compared to the maximum interest rates on other credit agreements, it was 
noticed that margins earned on unsecured loans were much greater. See Table 3 below for various 
types of interest rates as stipulated by the NCA. 
Table 3: Maximum Prescribed Interest Rates 
Agreement Type Maximum Prescribed Interest rate  
Mortgage agreements [(RR x 2.2) + 5%] per year 
Credit facilities [(RR x 2.2) + 10%] per year 
Unsecured credit agreements [(RR x 2.2) + 20%] per year 
Developmental credit agreements  
For the development of a small business [(RR x 2.2) + 20%] per year 
For low income housing (unsecured) [(RR x 2.2) + 20%] per year 
Short term credit transactions 5% per month 
Other credit agreements [(RR x 2.2) + 10%] per year 
Incidental credit agreements 2% per month 
Source: National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
Where,  
a) RR stands for reference rate, being the prevailing SA Reserve Bank Repurchase (repo) Rate; 
b) The interest rate on short term credit transactions and incidental credit agreements must be 
disclosed as a monthly interest rate, in such disclosure as was required by the Act. 
In a report by the Democratic Alliance (2013), it was noted that the relationship between the repo 
rate and the maximum interest rate on unsecured personal loans was exponential, leaving 
consumers disproportionately negatively affected should there be an increase in the repo rate. 
Given that the repo rate has remained stable since until 2012, this has not had any effect on 
consumers but since the SARB’s decision to increase interest rates in more recent times, the number 
of customers with impaired records has been notably increasing. 
An additional source of revenue to lenders is the initiation fee levied on all credit agreements at the 
acceptance stage of a credit agreement. Table 4 lists the fee applicable to credit agreements, as 
stipulated by the NCA 34 of 2005. 
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Table 4: Maximum Initiation fee 
Agreement Type Maximum initiation fee 
Mortgage agreements a) R1000 per credit agreement, plus, 10% 
of the amount of the agreement in 
excess of R10000 
b) But never to exceed R5000 
Credit facilities a) R150 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of 
the amount of the agreement in excess 
of R1000 
b) But never to exceed R1000 
Unsecured credit agreements a) R150 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of 
the amount of the agreement in excess 
of R1000 
b) But never to exceed R1000 
Developmental credit agreements  
For the development of a small business a) R250 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of 
the amount of the agreement in excess 
of R1 000 
b) But never to exceed R2 500 
For low income housing (unsecured) a) R500 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of 
the amount of the agreement in excess 
of R1 000 
b) But never to exceed R2 500 
Short term credit transactions a) R150 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of 
the amount of the agreement in excess 
of R1 000 
b) But never to exceed R1 000 
Other credit agreements a) R150 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of 
the amount of the agreement in excess 
of R1 000 
b) But never to exceed R1 000 
Incidental credit agreements Nil 
Source: National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
Where,  
a) The amount of the agreement is the amount deferred in terms of the agreement. 
An important supplementary condition applicable to initiation fees is that the fee may never exceed 
15% of the principal debt. The Act also stated that the maximum service fee prescribed is R50 per 
month. If this fee was levied on a transaction basis or on a combination of periodic and transaction 
bases, the total of such fees may not exceed the monthly or annual limit.  
In Figure 2 below, the level of unsecured debt is depicted from quarter four of 2007 to quarter four 
of 2013.  
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Figure 2: Growth of Unsecured credit by term 
 
Source: CCMR 
Credit granted to households by way of unsecured credit grew at a far slower pace between 1970 
and 1980 but since 1982 this increased more rapidly (Prinsloo, 2002). Prior to the NCA, Saambou 
Bank, Unifer and African Bank were the market leaders in the unsecured lending space. They were 
effectively legitimate micro-lenders with a total loan book of over R14 billion. Their success lay in the 
collection methods utilised, which was directly from the salaries of consumers, which meant an 
almost risk free loan from a micro-lenders perspective (Leriba Consulting, 2013). This allowed micro 
lenders to perform minimal affordability assessments on consumers and loan to primarily civil 
servants whose possibility of retrenchment was zero to none. When the direct salary deductions 
were stopped, Saambou Bank and Unifer saw a quick deterioration in their loan books and both 
collapsed. African Bank foresaw the need for a change in collection method prior and was therefore 
able to survive.  
South African banks soon gained momentum after the 2007/2008 world financial crisis and entered 
the unsecured lending arena, noting the huge profit potential available. The initial unsecured market 
comprised of smaller players such as African Bank and Capitec Bank. These financial institutions 
identified and responded to the high-margin opportunities in this arena (Euromonitor International, 
2014). Larger banks followed, although slow at first, lending only to their existing customer base. 
This soon changed when larger banks became more aggressive realising the massive profit potential 
in the unsecured lending field. First Avenue Investment Management (2012) called this the “gold 
rush” mentality by lenders due to the cost pressures hitting bottom lines. African Bank (2012) 
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reported that banks wanted a piece of the market share due to higher pricing ability, perceived 
superior returns on equity earned by micro-lenders and the ability, in respect of higher income 
customers, to reduce PD’s4and LGD’s5 by leveraging existing retail banking products (e.g. secured 
loans, current accounts etc.). They were able to get high margin lending from unsecured loans. 
Pricing for unsecured loans were very close to the maximum allowed under the NCA and even more 
profits were made from the additional initiation fees, monthly service fees and credit life insurance 
allowed on unsecured loans (Leriba Consulting, 2013 and Compliance and Risk Resources, 2012). 
Many studies conducted have come to the conclusion that the growth in unsecured lending was 
driven by both supply and demand factors (First Avenue Investment Management, 2012 and African 
Bank, 2012) but Compliance and Risk Resources (2012) observed that supply and demand factors 
cannot be viewed in isolation. The growth in unsecured lending needs to be analysed in totality as it 
is multi-dimensional in nature. Butters (2013) agreed that both the demand and supply of unsecured 
lending have fuelled its growth. The demand had remained fairly high and banks had an appetite to 
lend due to the source of funds being almost freely available via wholesale funding (asset managers), 
retail deposits and equity markets. African Bank (2012) noted support shown for the supply push of 
unsecured lending due to the significant increase in credit bureaus enquiries, which suggested a pre-
scoring activity by banks. This supply push was driven by the profitability of unsecured loans when 
taking into account all costs i.e. initiation fees, monthly service fees and credit life insurance policy 
instalments which can amount to as much as 70% of revenue (First Avenue Investment 
Management, 2012). Unsecured lending offered benefits to both parties under the contract but the 
rise was essentially supply driven (Deloitte, 2012). Euromonitor International (2014) suggested that 
unsecured lending bridged the gap that many South Africans faced due to higher utility costs putting 
pressure on disposable income. The challenging economic conditions made vulnerable consumers 
turn to unsecured lending to fund daily expenses. 
McLachlan (2012a) reported that the unsecured lending model revolved around three main and 
simultaneous activities that balance the relatively high risk of a single unsecured loan into a lower 
risk and highly profitable portfolio of unsecured loans: 1) Borrowing long where the lender must 
source long term funds at as low as possible interest rates6 2) Lending short where the lender enters 
into short term, high interest contract for small amounts. This allowed the lender to lend for shorter 
terms at higher rates without running into liquidity or solvency issues and 3) Understanding the 
consumer where the lender needed to analyse each consumer in terms of their ability to repay the 
loan. 
African Bank (2012) and Deloitte (2012) found that a feature of unsecured lending that was 
prevalent among all lenders in that space was the growth in higher value, longer term loans to 
relatively higher income earners. The unsecured lending framework was initially designed for low 
income earners but statistics show that higher income earners had become more active in that 
market. The statistics produced by the NCR confirmed this finding. Table 5 below depicts the 
                                                          
4 Probability of Default (PD) is a financial term describing the likelihood of a default over a particular time 
horizon. It provides an estimate of the likelihood that a borrower will be unable to meet its debt obligations. 
5 Loss Given Default (LGD) is the share of an asset that is lost when a borrower defaults. LGD is facility-specific 
because such losses are generally understood to be influenced by key transaction characteristics such as the 
presence of collateral and the degree of subordination. 
6 This can take the form of debentures, preference shares, term loans or even equity. 
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distribution of unsecured loans changed from more than 30% in the R0-R3500 income category in 
quarter four of 2007, to more than 30% in the greater than R15000 income category in quarter one 
of 2012 (Devpruth, 2012). 
Table 5: Unsecured lending by Income category 
Income Category 2007Q4 % Distribution 2007 Q4 2012Q1 % Distribution 2012 Q1 
R0-R3500 2 584 314 175 32.59% 2 469 519 652 11.27% 
R3501-R5500 1 145 099 857 14.44% 1 809 407 494 8.26% 
R5501-R7500 846 752 565 10.68% 2 466 268 788 11.25% 
R7501-R10K 898 391 477 11.33% 2 627 019 069 11.99% 
R10.1K-R15K 1 054 652 562 13.30% 4 609 711 639 21.04% 
>R15K 1 399 505 857 17.65% 7 932 030 974 36.20% 
Grand Total 7 928 716 493 100.00% 21 913 957 616 100.00% 
Source: Devpruth, 2012 
The change in lenders appetite was not due to the switch from secured lending to unsecured lending 
but rather the drive by lenders due to the economic attractiveness of unsecured lending versus 
other forms of credit. Finance theory explains that underlying returns influence how companies 
allocated capital. Higher returns (as a function of interest rates charges, loan initiation fees and 
credit life insurance) therefore attracted significant amounts of capital to the unsecured market 
(Butters, 2013). Compliance and Risk Resources (2012) cited the reasons for more unsecured loans 
granted, as per credit providers, was the NCA changing the limitations of the amount and tenor on 
unsecured loans. With the advent of the NCA, unsecured loans of up to R230000 with a tenor of up 
to 84 months were offered, whereas prior to the NCA, personal loans were limited to R10000 with a 
maximum term of 36 months. Kochan and O’Neill (2012) shared this view by stating that banks 
suffered more from shortages of liquidity than capital constraints therefore unsecured loans were 
seen as a boost to return on equity without tying up cash in mortgage lending.  
African Bank and Capitec Bank showed growth of 219% and 656% respectively in their unsecured 
books over the past 5 years. The reason for the massive growth was due to the SARB keeping 
interest rates constant. This allowed both institutions to increase loan sizes and maturities of their 
unsecured loans. The study did however state that those banks were at risk when they loan to 
customers whose primary bank accounts were at a different institutions and therefore whose credit 
profiling was more difficult to analyse and predict (Kochan and O’Neill, 2012). African Bank (2012) 
concurred with this view in that transactional banks assume that they had the ability to manage the 
risks inherent in unsecured lending to their own customers since they had the privileged access to 
customers’ salary accounts, in particular high income customers where these transactional accounts 
are more common. 
Devpruth (2012) and Compliance and Risk Resources (2012), both described the constrained growth 
in mortgages, since 2008, could have had to an extent, meant that consumers who previously could 
access mortgage finance may select unsecured credit as an alternative to meet their needs. They 
mentioned that unsecured credit could not be a full substitute to secured lending due to the product 
features of unsecured lending, but can be seen as complimentary.  Euromonitor International (2014) 
and Butters (2013) agreed with this conclusion and included that the constrained growth in the 
mortgage market was due to the unfavourable property market conditions with depressed property 
market values, costs relating to bond origination, debt review process challenges, relatively low 
margins and increases in capital requirements. 
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Fisher-French (2012) stated that the liquidity requirements under Basel III will further drive up the 
cost of funding especially of longer term home loans, making them less profitable. This made banks 
focus on profit drivers, one of which was the high margin unsecured credit product. Both this study 
and Butters (2013) rationalised that the spike in the growth rate of unsecured lending was due to 
previously unbanked consumers who entered the market and gained access to unsecured debt 
therefore pushing up the amounts. In addition to this, clients who have built up good credit records 
over the years were now able to get longer term and larger amount of loans as opposed to before 
they built such profiles. First Avenue Investment Management (2012) and Deloitte (2012) concurred 
that at the current levels of unsecured lending, no bubble was evident and therefore the bigger 
banks were safe. They did however note that Capitec Bank and African Bank were exposed to more 
danger and therefore needed to exercise caution. 
2.5  Credit bubble in South Africa 
Leriba Consulting (2013) and SAPA (2013) explained the reasons as to why there was no credit 
bubble forming in SA due to the growth in unsecured lending. This view was shared by Masekomeng 
et al (2012) which stated that the growth in unsecured credit did not pose an undue risk to the 
banking system in the short term. The one reason provided was that when compared to Saambou 
Bank and Unifer, the difference was that very little depositor funds were exposed to unsecured 
lending. The funds were sourced through other forms (bonds and equity) for smaller banks and 
bigger banks have huge balance sheets where unsecured lending comprised a very small percentage 
overall. The other explanation offered was that the growth in unsecured lending was necessary as it 
was essential for economic growth in South Africa, which was needed after the 2007/2008 financial 
recession. Both reasons seemed plausible in the short term. The question then was what about the 
long term?  
McLachlan (2012a) confirmed that larger listed entities that supplied unsecured loans had 
maintained their ability to raise capital, post the 2007/2008 credit crisis, but these loans had shorter 
terms (i.e. providers of capital demand quicker repayments) than before the crisis. Smaller players 
were not that lucky. They found it more and more difficult to obtain capital and therefore turned to 
shorter maturity capital (e.g. debt capital) as a form of financing of their loan books. In addition to 
the ability to raise capital, the impact of unsecured lending on larger commercial banks was limited 
as it constituted a small portion of their loan portfolio (McLachlan, 2012a). The report also 
differentiated between larger rated unsecured lenders who will be cushioned by their sizeable 
capital buffers, high margins and strong underwriting capabilities, should there be a drastic 
deterioration in asset quality. The other less sophisticated non-bank unsecured lending providers 
(unrated) remained the most exposed to deterioration in asset quality, particularly because of their 
weaker underwriting capabilities and lower capital and profitability buffers. 
First Avenue Investment Management (2012) noted that a feature of any lending bubble is that 
credit losses tend to hit all-time low levels just before the bust. The end of the cycle can arrive in one 
of two ways, 1) In an epic scale bubble where loans made at a peak of the cycle become bad almost 
instantaneously and 2) the cycle could end where larger players in the market start becoming 
stricter on lending, pushing customers to the other financiers left. This overflow would increase 
market share for these smaller lenders at an alarming rate, hopefully jolting them into realising that 
they need to also tighten underwriting criteria. This will terminate the blowing of an epic scale 
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bubble before it gathers the potential energy to bring down the economy as a whole. The National 
Treasury had a similar view in that unsecured credit does not pose significant risks to financial 
stability (Clark, 2012). It attributed most of the increase in growth of these loans to larger loans 
being granted over a longer period of time. The National Treasury Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement (MTBPS), however, flagged concerns over the practices related to garnishee orders where 
some loans eventually resulted in repayments of up to ten times of the original amount loaned to 
consumers. SARB’s concern was on systematic risk and not just pushing the consumer agenda and 
since unsecured lending was a small component of the big four South African banks (Absa bank, FNB, 
Nedbank and Standard Bank), systematic risk was relatively limited (Devnomics, 2012). SAPA (2013) 
did, however, make reference to credit providers conducting themselves in a responsible and 
transparent manner while still remaining ethical and compliant. It shared the view that irresponsible 
or inappropriate lending standards, often by banks, were one of the possible causes of credit 
bubbles. Adewale (2014) made mention that financial institutions had exploited the loopholes in the 
NCA, which did not expressly cover unsecured lending, and had therefore made huge profits from 
this type of credit, while not overtly lending recklessly. 
Masekomeng et al (2012) established that when South Africans use of unsecured loans was 
compared to the Ugandan market for the same type of product, Ugandans used these loans for 
economic purposes (i.e. financing of working capital and cashflow for business purposes or for asset 
appreciation purposes). South African data showed that these loans were used to finance lifestyle 
purchases which lead to no economic appreciation or wealth creation. This view was shared by 
Adewale (2014). First Avenue Investment Management (2012) and Devpruth (2012) tried to find the 
uses of unsecured loans obtained from financial institutions. Although it showed that a percentage 
was used on housing, building and renovations, a large percentage could not be accounted for, 
termed as “other” which led to the assumption that these loans were used for consumption and 
short lived benefits. This consumption category was the main concern which fuelled the argument of 
a credit bubble developing in South Africa.  
Devnomics (2012) explained that there are indications, on the one hand, that banks were pushing 
clients away from secured credit in favour of unsecured personal loans, while on the other hand a 
micro-lender in the field raised the fact that unsecured lending only relied on the affordability 
assessments that are being conducted and therefore is easier to grant loans. Therefore there was no 
concern that a bubble was emanating in that market. In their view, a bubble like the property bubble 
which was quite massively influenced by a drop in underlying asset value and a lack of demand for 
property was not likely to occur in a similar form in the unsecured space because affordability was 
the only driver to the granting of unsecured loans. Compliance & Risk Resources (2012) showed that 
the majority of unsecured personal loans advanced were to consumers that were vulnerable to 
changes in economic conditions and should economic conditions deteriorate, these consumers will 
be severely impacted. These consumers may also be exposed to events that impact them directly for 
example a dread disease. Leriba Consulting (2013) suggested regulatory amendments which 
included a standardised affordability test, regulation of the informal industry and regulation of rate 
disclosures to allow comparisons to be made. Deloitte (2012) agreed that due to the rapid increase 
in unsecured lending, preventative measures against future stress in the system may need to be 
considered in the event the growth rate continued at an accelerated pace. 
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Both First Avenue Investment Management (2012) and the Democratic Alliance (2013) revealed that 
consumers didn’t shop around to compare quotes in order to obtain the best deal from a lender in 
terms of interest rates and other fees or even to compare another product instead of an unsecured 
loan. One possible reason was that consumers were not aware that they could shop around or they 
just took the easy option of settling for what was given to them. Compliance & Risk Resources (2012) 
stated that factors that had influenced the growth in unsecured lending included the relative ease 
and speed at which an unsecured personal loan was obtained when compared to other types of 
credit. 
Consumers didn’t appreciate the full or true cost of credit; they only focused on the monthly 
instalment payable, which not only highlighted the financial illiteracy of the majority of consumers in 
South Africa but also the desperation by consumers to supplement income, no matter what the cost. 
Lenders have therefore been quite innovative, steering customers to lengthy terms and therefore 
higher amounts lent (Butters, 2013 and McLachlan, 2012a). Since consumers did not have the level 
of financial literacy to understand the impact of a difference in interest rate percentage, they mainly 
relied on rand values presented (Devnomics, 2012). The writer referred to a report published in 2005 
by researchers from the United States of America on findings done in SA where marketing strategies 
were investigated. They found that consumers were not only influenced by the instalment of a loan 
but also by the tenor of a loan and were therefore more likely to choose a loan with a lower 
instalment (higher rate but longer term) than one with a lower interest rate. 
Compliance and Risk Resources (2012) and Roestoff and Coetzee (2012) found that a high proportion 
of consumers with impaired accounts at credit bureaus were a concern from a consumer credit 
health perspective. This was the reason for further regulation of credit market which will not 
eliminate or significantly reduce an undesirable level of debt stress in the market. The NCR also 
suggested that impaired records needed to be monitored to see if the increasing trend was 
persistent or just seasonal (National Credit Regulator, 2012). 
2.6 The National Credit Act 35 of 2005 
The credit industry in South Africa is a large and complex environment, hence it is not surprising that 
new legislature will bring to the fore the various viewpoints of stakeholders in this industry, who are 
influenced by the role they fulfil within the credit value chain. The NCA does not necessarily have 
conflicting objectives, but objectives which will have to be weighed against each other, more 
specifically when it came to simultaneously providing access to credit and reducing the problems 
associated with high debt on both the economy and society (Devnomics, 2012). 
The National Credit Regulator (NCR) introduced the National Credit Act 35 of 2005, which repealed 
and replaced the Usury Act 73 of 1968 and Credit Agreements Act 74 of 1980, both of which 
previously governed the credit market in SA. The NCA was borne out of the need for a single system 
that could regulate the credit industry in South Africa (Pieterse, 2009). The South African Law 
Reform Commission found that the South African credit market was dysfunctional and subsequently 
highlighted the following problem areas (Pieterse, 2009): 
• Fragmented and outdated legislation, 
• Ineffective consumer protection, particularly in relation to consumers in low-income groups, 
• High cost of credit and, in some areas, access to credit, 
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• Rising levels of over-indebtedness, and 
• Reckless behaviour by credit providers and exploitation of consumers by micro-lenders, 
intermediaries, debt collectors and debt administrators. 
Due to these problems identified, the decision was made to introduce a single law that would be 
supervised by a single regulator. This led to the promulgation of the National Credit Act in 2005. 
The preamble of the act states the following (NCA 34 of 2005): 
The act was created to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer 
credit and for that purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit and improved 
standard of consumer information; to promote black economic empowerment and ownership within 
the consumer credit industry; to prohibit certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practises; to 
promote responsible credit granting and use and for that purpose to prohibit reckless credit granting; 
to provide for debt re-organisation in cases of over-indebtedness; to regulate credit information; to 
provide for registration of credit bureaux, credit providers and debt counselling services; to establish 
national norms and standards relating to consumer credit; to promote a consistent enforcement 
framework relating to consumer credit; to establish the National Credit Regulator and the National 
Consumer Tribunal; to repeal the Usury Act, 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act, 1980; and to 
provide for related incidental matters. 
The NCR was therefore mandated to monitor the industry and report irregularities and 
inconsistencies identified. One of the objectives of the NCA was to level the playing fields amongst 
credit providers and consumers with regards to the manner in which credit was granted, how 
consumers were treated when applying for credit and during the relationship with the credit 
provider and to limit over-indebtedness by placing the responsibility on credit providers to ensure 
they didn’t grant credit recklessly. See Appendix 1 for the purposes of the NCA 34 of 2005. 
Feasibility (2009) found that the NCA bridged the gap between the capped usury market and the 
uncapped exempt market for microloans. According to the study the greatest impact that the NCA 
has had was on the pricing of microloans, which dramatically decreased after its implementation. 
While there was a need for increased compliance, the credit market framework was designed for 
encouraging access to credit. This access to credit was made possible through the relatively high 
interest rate caps in respect of unsecured personal loans as well as other revenue streams available 
to credit providers, including credit life insurance premiums. If these had to change, access to credit 
will be impacted (Compliance and Risk Resources, 2012). 
Renke (2011) stated that one purpose of the NCA was to protect customers. This purpose was 
attained by, amongst others, promoting responsibility in the credit market by avoidance of over-
indebtedness by consumers and deterring reckless credit by credit providers. According to Goodwin-
Groen and Kelly-Louw (2006), the fundamental purpose of the NCA was to achieve integrity in the 
credit market. For so long the South African credit market had been riddled with biased and unfair 
lending practices, inappropriate disclosures and an imbalance between credit providers and 
consumers. The NCA was developed with the objective of righting these injustices. 
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The NCA conferred the following rights to all consumers (NCA 34 of 2005): 
• The right to apply for credit (section 60 of the NCA), 
• The right not to be discriminated against when applying for credit (section 61 of the NCA), 
• The right to be given reasons for credit being declined (section 62 of the NCA), 
• The right to be given documents in an official language that the customer understands 
(section 63 of the NCA), 
• The right to be given documents in plain and understandable language (section 64 of the 
NCA), 
• The right to be given documents related to the credit transaction (section 65 of the NCA), 
• The right to confidential treatment (section 68 of the NCA), and 
• The right to access and challenge information held by a credit bureau (section 72 of the 
NCA). 
The Act requires the NCR, amongst other things, to promote the development of an accessible credit 
market and particularly to address the needs of (Devnomics, 2012): 
• Historically disadvantage persons; 
• Low-income persons; 
• Remote and isolated communities; and 
• Low-density communities. 
According to the NCA a credit agreement is defined as: “an agreement between a credit provider 
and a consumer in which: 
• The credit provider supplies goods or services or lends money to the consumer and; 
• The consumer pays for the goods or services or repays the money borrowed in instalments 
over a period of time; or 
• Where the consumer is to make a single payment, this payment is made on a future date 
agreed upon by the consumer and the credit provider; and 
• The consumer has to pay interest, fees or charges on the outstanding balance of the money 
borrowed or the amount owing on the goods and services supplied by the credit provider; 
• The consumer and the credit provider enter into a pawn transaction, discount transaction, 
instalment sale agreement, mortgage agreement, or lease agreement; 
• The credit provider enters into a credit guarantee agreement with one person where this 
person promises to pay a debt incurred by another consumer upon receiving a demand from 
the credit provider.” 
The agreements that don’t fall within the ambit of the NCA include closer than arm’s length 
transactions, agreements where the credit provider is the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), 
agreements that are large agreements in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person with an 
asset value or turnover above the threshold value of R1 million at the time of conclusion of the 
agreement and agreements in which the credit provider is situated outside the borders of South 
Africa (Goodwin-Groen and Kelly-Louw, 2006). 
Adewale (2014) argued that although an increase in credit consumption is beneficial to the 
economy, unlimited credit consumption eventually decreases disposable income of consumers. The 
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NCA’s role is specifically to address the opportunistic behaviour of credit providers, while still 
warning consumers of the dangers associated with taking on too much debt.  
About 23% of adults (those people over the years of 18) said their households’ financial situation 
worsened when compared to 2001 and this resulted in increased borrowing and lower savings. The 
reasons for borrowing were closely related to the economic challenges people experienced (Finmark 
Trust, 2012). The report showed that by 2012 borrowing done at financial institutions increased 
across all demographics. This increase was largely due to the access to credit and financial inclusion, 
which the NCR was required to address. The Act required the NCR to promote the development of 
an accessible credit market, particularly to address the needs of historically disadvantaged persons, 
low income persons and remote, isolated or low density communities. Feasibility (2009) showed that 
access to credit for low income earners still posed a challenge, but research showed that post NCA, 
in roads were being made. 
The NCA’s impact on credit providers was twofold. Firstly the financial impact of compliance to the 
Act was considerable in direct and indirect terms. The level of credit granting to prevent over-
indebtedness and maximum fees and interest rates reduce profitability to credit providers. In 
addition to this, the NCA prescribed more rigorous processes from initial stages of a credit 
application though to recovery of debt and reporting (Devnomics, 2012). 
Section 101 (1) of the Act stipulates the cost of credit. This section explains all the costs included 
under a credit agreement, which must not require payment by the consumer of any money or other 
consideration, except – 
a) The principal debt, being the amount deferred in terms of the agreement, plus the value of 
any item contemplated in section 102, 
b) An initiation fee, which –  
i. May not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt, and  
ii. Must not be applied unless the application results in the establishment of a credit 
agreement with that consumer, 
c) A service fee, which – 
i. In the case of a credit facility, may be payable monthly, annually, on a transaction 
basis or on a combination of periodic and transaction basis, or 
ii. In any other case, may be payable monthly or annually, and 
iii. Must not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt; 
d) Interest, which – 
i. Must be expressed in percentage terms as an annual rate calculated in the 
prescribed manner; and 
ii. Must not exceed the applicable maximum prescribed rate determined in terms of 
section 105; 
e) Cost of any credit insurance provided in accordance with section 106 
f) Default administration charges, which – 
i. May not exceed the prescribed maximum for the category of credit agreement 
concerned, and 
ii. May be imposed only if the consumer has defaulted on a payment obligation under 
the credit agreement, and only to the extent permitted by part C of Chapter 6, and 
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g) Collection costs, which may not exceed the prescribed maximum for the category of credit 
agreement concerned and may be imposed only to the extent permitted by Part C of Chapter 
6. 
Madubeko (2010) and Adewale (2014) both agreed that the NCA had played a part in protecting 
South Africa from the 2007/2008 financial crisis, if not in whole, most definitely in part. In addition 
to this, banks were not extensively exposed to global financial products but they did experience a 
decrease in profits and increase in strain due to the crisis (Madubeko, 2010). Fakir (2014) bluntly 
stated that the NCA and the NCR were meant to protect consumers from unscrupulous lenders and 
provide a more stable and regulated environment but both have not met this undertaking. 
It was reported that the NCA exerted both positive and negative influences on the access to credit. 
Although the interest cap was lifted in order for credit providers to profitably serve those that could 
not be served before, the NCA required credit providers to perform affordability assessments, which 
could have an adverse effect on the granting of credit (Feasibility, 2009). Prinsloo (2002) stated that 
the availability of credit made it easier for households to spend. This increase in credit convinced 
consumers to buy now instead of putting it off for the future. The NCA made this possible by 
creating access to credit, specifically to those who could and probably would never have had such 
access. 
Bonorchis (2012) confirmed that under Basel III, a global set of banking rules was being implemented 
over the next six years where the registrar can apply what was known as a counter-cyclical buffer, 
which meant lenders would have to hold additional capital when his agency determined credit 
growth was excessive. 
The NCA was noted to be a great improvement on its predecessors and was comparable to 
international legislature, more specifically to the European Union (Renke, 2011). Although the NCA 
was world-class there were a few areas that required further attention, namely consumer education, 
high costs of credit for smaller loans and the prescribed court orders with regards to reckless 
lending. More consumers enjoyed its protection with regards to prevention of unnecessary 
consumer spending, reckless credit lending and over-indebtedness. 
2.7 Over-indebtedness and reckless lending 
Reckless credit and over-indebtedness were new concepts introduced by the NCA into the South 
African legal system. In layman’s terms reckless credit is the granting of credit without performing 
proper affordability assessments at the point of granting credit and over-indebtedness is when 
consumers could not satisfy all debt obligations taking into consideration financial means, prospects 
and other obligations. The issue of over-indebtedness and reckless credit are determining factors in 
granting further credit to a consumer who already could not afford current debt. It is therefore the 
ultimate determinant of the credit worthiness of a consumer. Should a consumer be over-indebted, 
no further credit should be granted to this consumer. 
NCA 34 of 2005 states that credit is said to be lent recklessly if either  
• the credit provider took no steps to assess the proposed consumers general understanding 
and appreciation of the risks and costs of the proposed credit agreement and his rights and 
obligations under the agreement, his repayment history for credit, existing financial means, 
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prospects and obligations and where there was a reasonable basis to conclude that any 
commercial purpose may prove to be successful, if the consumer has such a purpose for the 
credit, or  
• after conducting an assessment, the credit provider still entered into the credit agreement 
with the consumer despite the fact that the preponderance of information available to the 
credit provider indicated that the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate his 
risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement; or if entering into the credit 
agreement would make the consumer over-indebted (see section 80 (1) read with section 81 
(2) of the National Credit Act) 
Over-indebtedness was defined as follows7 (NCA 34 of 2005):  
“A consumer is over-indebted if the preponderance of available information at the time a 
determination is made indicates that the consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in a timely manner 
all the obligations under all credit agreements to which the consumer is party, having regard to that 
consumer’s: 
a) financial means, prospects and obligations, and 
b) probable propensity under all the credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, as 
indicated by the consumer’s history of debt repayment,” 
In layman’s terms over-indebtedness is when a consumer cannot pay his debts, mostly when he 
failed to pay the monthly instalment due. More formally, a consumer is over-indebted if he is or will 
be unable to satisfy in a timely manner all obligations under all credit agreements to which he is a 
participant (De Villiers, 2010). 
Reckless credit does not apply to juristics, but only to natural persons. It also does not apply to 
school or student loans, emergency loans, public interest credit agreements, incidental credit 
agreements and temporary increases8. 
Given that one of the causes of the increase in over-indebtedness in 1990’s was the lax regulatory 
environment, many have come to believe that the primary tool for addressing over-indebtedness 
was tighter regulation of the suppliers of credit. This rationale was perhaps most evident in the NCA, 
which explicitly lists the prevention of over-indebtedness as one of its main objectives. 
Problems brought on by over-indebtedness can be summarised as follows (Goodwin-Groen and 
Kelly-Louw, 2006): 
• Over-indebtedness and the debt servicing burden reduce household disposable income; 
reduce household consumption and household welfare. 
• Over-indebted consumers were less likely to meet municipal service payments, which in turn 
undermines local authority income and capacity. 
• Over-indebted consumers could not make maintenance payments or meet other personal 
social commitments. 
                                                          
7 Section 79 of NCA 34 of 2005 
8 Section 86 Part D of NCA 34 of 2005 
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• Defaulting borrowers get summonsed and receive default judgments. This impaired their 
credit records and in most cases mean that they were denied access to conventional finance 
for many years. 
• Consumers that have defaulted may not qualify for housing loans or other forms of 
conventional credit. They may be locked into high risk/high cost forms of finance, with the 
high cost of finance further undermining household welfare in the future. 
• Social welfare payments received by households may well be diverted to servicing high-
interest loans; to meeting legal expenses related to opposing judgments; or to meeting 
payments that result from judgments having been granted. In each instance, the social grant 
had been diverted away from the intended purpose of increasing the income and welfare of 
the beneficiaries. Rather than the targeted beneficiaries benefiting from such payments, 
financial institutions increase interest income, lawyers increase fees and debt collectors and 
debt administrators increase income. 
• To recover the losses from loans to defaulting borrowers, lenders have to increase interest 
rates on loans to the client base that do meet their commitments. 
Devnomics (2012) highlighted two forms of over-indebtedness. One is general over-indebtedness, 
which occurred usually though a change in circumstances, after the consumer had entered into the 
credit agreement. The other is termed reckless over-indebtedness where the mere entering into the 
agreement was putting the consumer into a situation of over-indebtedness, i.e. the lending was 
reckless. Reckless lending can only be argued by a consumer if via a debt counsellor, it has been 
established the consumer was indeed over-indebted. The aim of approaching a debt counsellor is to 
be declared over-indebted, have protection and have debt restructured by using the consumers’ 
current and future monthly cashflows to conduct an assessment (de Villiers, 2010). 
Calomiris (2009) examined the fine line that government must tread between protecting consumers 
from becoming over-indebted and supporting the profitability of credit providers so as to increase 
access to credit.  Amongst developing countries, the South African case was unique in that the 
government had expressly indicated its desire to increase access whilst at the same time protecting 
consumers from becoming over-indebted. Given that this protection was typically introduced 
through administrative measures that were costly to the credit providers, there was a trade-off 
between the government’s objective of increasing access to finance and that of preventing 
indebtedness. The government was caught somewhere in the middle. Karodia and Soni (2014) share 
the same opinion. Nyaruwata (2009) stated that although credit vetting was mandatory according 
the NCA, compliance costs had risen quickly making it discouraging to lenders, which resulted in less 
of an incentive to increase credit growth especially in the smaller loan category. Nyaruwata (2009) 
also concluded that it was clear that the government’s regulations have not been set so as to reduce 
the incidence of becoming of becoming over-indebted. With the maximum interest rates and the use 
of maximum service and initiation fees charged by credit providers, consumers can still very easily 
become party to an agreement that could lead to over-indebtedness. 
The onus is on credit providers to prove that with the information provided, an assessment test was 
conducted, and a loan was granted or not. Prior to the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014, 
the affordability assessment conducted by a credit provider was based on their policies and 
procedures. The Act did not specify what the affordability assessment needed to be comprised of, it 
just needed to be conducted. Due to this ambiguity in the NCA, the National Credit Amendment Act 
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introduced compulsory affordability assessment regulations where credit providers were required, 
prior to granting credit, to determine the financial means and prospects of a consumer, the 
consumers existing financial obligations and their debt repayment history. In addition to this, there 
were minimums to be set aside for food, accommodation and travel and this needed to be excluded 
from income in order to get a more realistic picture of affordability.  
The Act also stipulated that consumers needed to be truthful and fully comply with requests by 
credit providers when applying for credit. If it is alleged in court that a consumer under a credit 
agreement was over-indebted, the court may either refer the matter directly to a debt counsellor to 
evaluate the consumers’ circumstances and make a recommendation to court in terms of section 86 
(1)9 or declare that the consumer was over-indebted and make any order envisaged in section 8710 
to relieve the consumers’ over-indebtedness (de Villiers, 2010). Section 8311 of the Act sets out 
measures a court can apply when making orders regarding findings of reckless credit granting, which 
included setting aside the consumers obligations or part thereof, suspension of the effect of the 
credit agreement and the restructuring of the consumers total debt obligations. 
Appendix 2 includes the credit industry code of conduct to combat over-indebtedness in terms of 
section 48 (1) (b) of the NCA. This code provided the commitments made by credit providers to 
ensure that responsible lending was conducted and that the consumer went through a 
comprehensive and thorough assessment prior to granting credit. 
An unintended consequence of the NCA is its use by consumers as a way to lessen their 
responsibility of attaining credit without becoming over-indebted. These consumers were of the 
opinion that the NCA should make certain that they can afford the credit that they have applied for 
and should additionally sort out any issues that may arise (Devnomics, 2012). Regrettably if 
consumers don’t disclose information to credit providers, the credit provider can arrive at the wrong 
decision, in which case, it is the consumer who is accountable for becoming over-indebted. The 
report also highlighted the abuse of the 60 day period by consumers. This 60 day period is used to 
establish a debt restructuring plan but consumers instead used this as a payment holiday. Statistics 
showed that consumers would ensure that critical assets like cars and houses were up to date but 
with the abuse of the 60 day period, this proved no longer the case. Another unintended 
consequence of the NCA was the inability to restructure loans by credit providers (Devnomics, 2012). 
Although the Act is meant to provide assistance to consumers who get into financial difficulty, the 
reckless lending test is not properly explained hence challenging to credit providers. The same report 
explained this concept by way of the following example. Historically credit providers could 
restructure a loan allowing consumers extended payment terms and capitalising arrear amounts to 
help reduce pressure on a consumer. Post NCA, credit providers were hesitant to conduct such 
restructures as this would effectively be construed as entering a new contract which would need to 
meet affordability criteria. In the case of financial difficulty, a new agreement would more easily be 
termed reckless lending. The credit provider would therefore rather remain committed to the old 
contract than a new, more manageable contract for fear of being deemed reckless. 
                                                          
9 Section 86 (1) of NCA 34 of 2005 
10 Section 87 of NCA 34 of 2005 
11 Section 83 of NCA 34 of 2005 
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The National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 addressed the need for proper and realistic 
guidelines in terms of credit assessment processes. The NCA allowed credit providers to accept any 
disclosure made by consumers in terms of income and expenditure even though it was a blatant 
understatement of reality, as this would still be deemed a credit assessment conducted and 
therefore could not be construed as reckless credit granting. Credit providers were aware of the 
steep sanctions that could be imposed for reckless credit granting (fines and agreements set aside 
and therefore become unrecoverable) hence they ensured an assessment was done, however only 
relied on consumer disclosure, which if can be proven was conducted accordingly, the credit 
provider cannot assume responsibility for over-indebtedness. 
2.8 The debt review process 
The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and the NCA’s objectives were not created to deny creditors of their 
entitlement but merely to regulate the manner and extent of their received payment (Roestoff and 
Coetzee, 2012). De Villiers (2010) reported that the NCA suggested the route of debt review as the 
first alternative and less drastic option before debt enforcement in courts were embarked upon. It 
normally started at the initiative of the consumer who realised that he/she needed help and 
therefore approached a debt counsellor on his/her own accord. The consumer may also apply for a 
debt review after receiving a section 129 (1) notice from a credit provider in which this option is 
indicated. If a consumer alleged over-indebtedness under a credit agreement in a court, this court 
can refer the matter directly to a debt counsellor for debt review (de Villiers, 2010). A debt 
counsellor does not declare a consumer as over-indebted. The debt counsellors’ duty is only the 
assessment of possible over-indebtedness and possible reckless lending (Roestoff et al, 2009). 
The concept of a debt counsellor was introduced by the NCA.  The debt counsellor was defined, 
according to regulation 1 of the NCA of 2005 as, “a neutral person who is registered in terms of 
section 44 of the Act, offering a service of debt counselling”, the latter being understood as 
“performing the functions contemplated in section 86 of the Act.” 
Roestoff et al (2009) pointed out that the debt counselling process relied on the consumer, credit 
provider and debt counsellor working together and in good faith. Due to the increase in impaired 
records at credit bureaus, the process of debt review was highly necessary but since it was not 
effective, most customers end up in the sequestration process. Roestoff and Coetzee (2012) stated 
that the primary objective of the Insolvency Act was to ensure an orderly and fair distribution of the 
debtors’ assets in circumstances where these assets were insufficient to satisfy all creditors’ claims. 
An alternative to sequestration was debt review,12 which the purpose was not to relieve consumers’ 
obligations but to achieve either a voluntary debt re-arrangement or a debt re-arrangement by the 
Magistrates’ court. 
The step by step debt review process listed below (Arde, 2013): 
1. When you apply for debt counselling, you have to fill out an application form, called Form 16, 
which you submit, together with all your credit agreements, to a debt counsellor.  
                                                          
12 Other alternatives include administration orders and pre-liquidation composition with creditors (Roestoff 
and Coetzee, 2012). 
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2. The first thing the debt counsellor does is assess whether you are over-indebted or debt stressed, 
and whether or not your creditors were reckless in granting you credit.  
3. The debt counsellor has 30 business days, from the date of your application, in which to make this 
determination.  
4. Within five business days of accepting your application for debt counselling, your debt counsellor 
must inform all your creditors and the credit bureaus of your application. The debt counsellor does 
this by sending your creditors a prescribed form (Form 17.1) and calling on them to issue a 
certificate of balance (which is a “certified notice of the balance of a customer’s account, and 
accrued interest and charges, at the close of business on a specific date”).  
5. So that you continue to pay your creditors throughout the process, your debt counsellor will draw 
up an interim repayment plan, which he or she must submit to a registered payment distribution 
agency (PDA).  
6. During the first 60 business days from the date of your application to be placed in debt 
counselling, legal action may not be taken against you in respect of debts that are “under review”. 
This means that if the credit provider has not already proceeded with legal action against you, you 
have two months in which to negotiate a payment arrangement. But if your creditors have already 
begun taking action against you in respect of certain of your debts, you don’t enjoy this protection, 
and these debts can be excluded from debt counselling.  
7. Within five business days of receiving a Form 17.1, your creditors are required to provide your 
debt counsellor with certificates of your account balances. This information helps the debt 
counsellor to determine whether or not you are over-indebted and to conduct an affordability 
assessment. The affordability assessment is aimed at working out how much you can realistically 
afford to spend on debt repayments.  
8. Once your debt counsellor has determined whether you are over-indebted or debt stressed, he or 
she is obliged to follow a certain procedure as prescribed in the National Credit Act. The procedure 
will depend on the debt counsellor’s determination.  
9. If your debt counsellor determines that you are over-indebted and legally eligible for debt 
counselling, he or she must notify all your creditors and the credit bureaus of this by sending them a 
prescribed form, Form 17.2, marking the appropriate paragraph that confirms you are over-
indebted.  
10. If your debt counsellor determines that you are not over-indebted or eligible for debt 
counselling, he or she must reject your application and send a Form 17.2 to all your creditors and the 
credit bureaus, marking the paragraph that confirms that you are not over-indebted.  
11. If your debt counsellor determines that you are over-indebted, he or she will draw up a 
repayment plan to rearrange your debt obligations in line with what you can realistically afford. Your 
debt counsellor must submit the plan to your creditors for their consent within 60 business days of 
receiving your application for a debt review.  
12. If all your creditors accept your debt counsellor’s repayment proposal, your debt counsellor must 
obtain a consent order from the National Consumer Tribunal or a magistrate’s court, again within 60 
days.  
13. If you or any of your creditors rejects the repayment proposal, your debt counsellor must refer 
the matter to a magistrate’s court with a recommendation, which he or she will seek to have made 
an order of court. A magistrate can reject the debt counsellor’s recommendation if he or she 
considers the proposal unreasonable. Unless the magistrate gives the counsellor another chance to 
improve on the proposal, this has the effect of a termination of the debt review process.  
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14. If your creditors accept the repayment plan, or if a magistrate’s court agrees to the repayment 
plan, a PDA will channel your revised payments to your creditors. You make these payments directly 
to the PDA. The PDA is responsible for providing monthly statements to you and payment schedules 
to your debt counsellor and creditors, as well as attending to queries from the respective parties. 
(You can be charged three percent of distributable income by a PDA, but this is capped at R500 a 
month.)  
15. Once all of your debts have been paid, your debt counsellor will issue you with a clearance 
certificate and will notify the credit bureaus that you are no longer in debt counselling. The fact that 
you were in debt counselling will be expunged from your credit record, but if you had judgments 
against you, these will remain on your record for the remainder of the five-year data retention 
period.  
A pivotal problem in the debt review process was that the exact procedure to be followed when 
conducting a debt review was not fully regulated in the Act or the Regulations (de Villiers, 2010). 
Roestoff et al (2009) explained that debt counsellors provided consumers with insufficient 
information on the debt counselling process, which posed a significant challenge to the review 
process. The solution provided was a possible enhancement of Form 16. Roestoff and Coetzee 
(2012) explained that the debt review process did not offer the consumer an opportunity to obtain 
discharge from pre-existing indebtedness. They offered the following as shortcomings of the debt 
review process: 
• Only applicable to agreements under section 8 of the Act. 
• Agreements where a credit provider has proceeded to enforce are excluded. This is achieved 
by a section 129 notice being sent to a consumer once he/she was in default. 
• There was no time limit prescribed in respect of a payment plan. 
 Roestoff et al (2009) cited the following reasons for the ineffectiveness of the debt counselling 
process: 
• A sharp increase in the number of consumers applying for debt review and a concomitant 
shortage of competent debt counsellors. 
• Many debt counsellors trained and registered by the NCR do not practise because it was not 
feasible for them to do so. 
• Consumers were still uneducated on the objectives of the debt review process. Debt 
counsellors often failed to inform consumers of the consequences of debt counselling. 
Consequently many consumers were under the erroneous impression that debt counselling 
afforded them a payment holiday. 
• Consumers were often not willing to accept that they cannot maintain the same standard of 
living that got them into their financial predicament in the first place. 
• Credit providers failed to take responsibility for the negative consequences of credit granting 
and do not appreciate the fact that they will have to take losses and write-off debts. 
• Although an application for debt review stops credit providers from taking legal action 
against the consumer, nothing stops the credit provider from pursuing the debt. 
• The amount of debt concerned often does not justify the legal costs that will be incurred to 
take the matter to court. 
• Legal uncertainty existed regarding the interpretation of the NCA’s provisions pertaining to 
the debt counselling process. 
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Devnomics (2012) made the following recommendations around updating the legislature on the 
debt counselling process: 
1. Debt counsellors should have a certain number of years of general experience in addition to 
debt counselling experience and a tertiary qualification. 
2. Jurisdiction as to whether or not the High Court of the Magistrates court has powers in 
terms of section 85 needs clarity. 
3. A new form (Form 16) should be introduced to advice consumers on the consequences of 
the debt review process. 
4. To allow for recovery of some of the debt counselling fees from credit providers, regulations 
and section 86 (3) need to be changed. 
5. Amendment of Section 86 (2) to refer to Section 130 instead of section 129. 
6. Introduction of prescribed forms for the credit providers to submit their certificates of 
balance. 
7. Amendment of section 86 (6) to include the instance where a recommendation was made by 
the debt counsellor in terms of section 86 (7) (c) and provide for the obtaining of a consent 
order when a debt restructuring proposal is accepted by all credit providers. 
8. Clarity was needed on the procedure to be followed in court when a matter was referred to 
the Magistrate Court because the consumer and credit providers could not reach consensus 
on a debt restructuring proposal. Issues around jurisdiction need to be addressed.  
9. Amendment of section 86 (7) (c) and section 87 to provide for the fact that the court could 
enforce a discharge of part of the consumer’s debt obligations. 
10. Amend section 14 (a) to add Payment Distribution Agents (PDA) to the parties that the NCR 
should regulate in addition to credit providers, credit bureaus and debt counsellors and set 
standards for operation in terms of having sufficient human, financial and operational 
resources to enable the function as well as relevant and adequate administrative measures 
and controls to enable an efficient and accurate performance of the function. 
11. Regulate the process to be followed when a consumer or the debt counsellor withdraws 
from the process outlining notifications required as well as setting out the implications for 
the consumer. 
Only after certain stakeholders met in July 2008, a new set of rules and procedures to streamline the 
debt review process was published, however several problems still remained.  
In order to address this dilemma, the NCR introduced the following acts: 
• Draft debt counselling regulations were issued in May 2009. 
• Application was lodged with the High Court of South Africa to obtain a declaratory order 
with respect to the difficulties that particular debt counsellors experience when taking 
proposals to court. 
• It commissioned the Law Clinic at the University of Pretoria to investigate the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of the debt review process and to identify the parties who were to blame for 
these. 
Karodia and Soni (2014) provided the following preventative steps to minimise the risk of over-
indebtedness in the future: 
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• Setting of proper affordability criteria and clear definition of a reckless loan. 
• Credit granting should not only be affordable but suitable to the consumers need. 
• Credit providers need to enhance disclosure to a consumer in terms of products offered and 
alternatives to suit consumers’ needs. 
• Review of interest rate limits prescribed by the NCA. 
• Strengthening of regulatory monitoring, supervision and enforcement to ensure the shutting 
down of unregistered credit providers and full compliance by registered credit providers. 
• Regulators should act in unison. 
• Reviewing of regulatory framework for credit insurance policies that are sold with or linked 
to credit. 
• Setting norms and standards for emolument attachment orders issued for credit. 
• Setting norms and standards for access to the payments systems, including debit orders. 
• Extending and strengthening the debt collection laws to apply to law firms. 
• Regulating credit linked deductions allowed on employer payroll systems. 
• Investigating simpler and lower cost insolvency arrangements for lower and middle income 
people. 
Karodia and Soni (2014) also explained the following as the South African governments rescue 
efforts towards the abuse of debt (Arde, 2013): 
• Engaging with lenders and their industry associations to provide relief to qualified distressed 
borrowers by reducing their instalment burden, without additional cost to the borrower. 
• Engaging with lenders to take steps to withdraw certain categories of existing emoluments 
attachment orders for credit, and to use such orders for future credit only as a last resort 
and according to a robust code of conduct. 
• Encouraging employers to investigate the legitimacy of all emolument attachment orders 
they may be enforcing against their employees (for purposes of credit, not child or spousal 
maintenance) and to write to credit providers to reduce or even remove all onerous orders.  
• Government was also considering regulating debt collection firms, including law firms, to 
ensure that they do not indulge in unscrupulous debt collection practices. 
• Enabling major lenders to provide voluntary debt relief measures to distressed borrowers 
without charge, in addition to the current debt counselling process, subject to compliance 
with the NCA and Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act. 
Fakir (2014) contended that the money lending industry should not only undergo essential review, 
but also be changed to an industry which caters to the needs of the poor instead of being an 
industry that feeds of extortion. He went on to explain that the Marikana massacre that occurred in 
South Africa was due to workers having higher levels of debt than income could sustain. 
2.9  Recent developments in South Africa’s unsecured lending space 
Banks extended unsecured credit generously, knowing that since it consisted of only a small 
percentage of their total book debt, the risk of systemic failure was contained. African Bank, unlike 
other banks, was not a deposit taking institution, but was well aware of the considerable margins 
available in the unsecured lending market. Calomiris (2009) claimed that a survey of banking crises 
suggested unusual bank vulnerabilities to risk inviting micro-economic rules of the banking game 
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established by governments. In the South African space, it can be argued that ABIL took excessive 
risk in the unsecured market, although well aware of consequences of its actions. The NCR can be 
liken to Calomiris’s governments by establishing the maximum interest rates that could be charged 
on unsecured loans, making it a highly profitable business. ABIL was also aware that SARB, the 
lender-of-last-resort, would not allow the entity to collapse for two reasons. One and most 
importantly, it would send a wave of shock to investors and possibly cause a bank run and two, a 
major shareholder of ABIL was the government workers pension fund. Chauhan (2012) found that in 
most countries the central bank oversees the deposit insurance activities of banks and acts as a 
lender-of-last resort. Both these activities called for banks to be effectively regulated so that they did 
not take advantage of these facilities by lending recklessly and thus exposing themselves and the 
economy to risks. Chauhan (2012) also noted that the deposit insurance activities protects 
depositors (South Africa does not have deposit insurance) and the lender-of-last resort were 
facilities offered by the central bank to illiquid but solvent banks or to insolvent banks that were 
“too big to fail.” 
Although regulators, investors and many scholars concurred that SA was not at risk of developing a 
credit bubble in the unsecured lending space, they still expressed their concern regarding the rate at 
which it was growing. This was not a superfluous concern especially due to the recent troubles faced 
by microlender, African Bank. African Bank’s financial problems left SA’s financial sector shaken and 
sent waves of panic throughout the international financial community, which left rating agencies no 
choice but to downgrade not only ABIL, but Capitec Bank and SA’s big four banks (Absa Bank, First 
National Bank, Nedbank and Standard Bank). This was done despite protests from SARB assuring 
rating agencies that African Bank’s downfall was particular to the bank and would not affect other 
banks in the industry. In 2014 ABIL went public with the message of needing around R8.5 billion in 
extra cash in order to meet obligations to investors and creditors. This was only a few months after a 
rights issue in which it raised new cash. The request by ABIL led to a massive drop in share price and 
investor confidence, which ultimately led to the downfall of African Bank. This downfall was wholly 
to blame on the institutions’ business model which consisted of very little and insignificant deposits, 
while it provided unsecured personal loans and credit cards to low income earners. The institution 
did not diversify its activities and based on the demand for unsecured personal loans, the model 
seemed to make business sense at the time. As time passed though, African Bank’s debtor book was 
not as profitable as before since consumers were not able to pay and in addition to this, were 
offered more loans by the bank itself. These ill-advised business conducts led to the banks ultimate 
downfall and demise.  The bank is currently under curatorship. 
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Chapter 3:  Research questions 
In the past few years, both locally and internationally, there have been frequent studies conducted 
on the growth of unsecured lending in South Africa, but all these studies were done specifically to 
investigate the supply and demand factors that fuelled the growth of unsecured credit. The 
phenomenon being researched in this study is banks adherence to the NCA and its effects on 
domestic indebtedness and fragility.  
The research questions below have been developed to understand how the NCA has impacted SA’s 
credit industry, particularly in relation to the unsecured personal loans arena. The questions will 
determine if banks, in particular, utilised certain loopholes in the Act to extend credit in excess and 
thereby create a cause for concern. The research questions will firstly try to understand the real 
impact of the NCA on the credit industry in SA, more specifically in relation to unsecured lending. 
Secondly the aim is also to understand what fuelled the growth in unsecured lending in SA. Thirdly, is 
to investigate whether banks perform suitable and relevant credit assessments on consumers and 
what these credit assessments entail and finally to investigate whether the NCA was one of the main 
drivers in the growth of unsecured credit. 
General research question: 
Did the NCA assist banks in forestalling a credit bubble from forming in SA or did the NCA in fact 
inadvertently aid the process? 
Specific research questions from review of empirical extant studies: 
• Does the consumer fully understand the NCA (including reckless lending, debt counselling 
services and credit bureau judgements)? 
• What are the reasons for the unprecedented growth in unsecured loans in SA? 
• What measures are in place to curb reckless lending and consumer over-indebtedness in SA? 
• How effective is the NCA in regulating credit in SA? 
• Was there a credit bubble developing in SA due to the growth in unsecured credit? 
Specific research questions from literature review: 
• What causes a banking crisis? 
• What effect did the NCA have on the SA credit industry? 
• What are the major limitations in the NCA? 
• What are the shortcomings of the debt review process by financial services firms in SA? 
These questions seek to determine if the NCA, prior to the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 
2014, was one of the reasons banks increased their unsecured loan books. Experts’ views, via 
interviews, on these questions will be explored to hopefully gain some insight into the issues of the 
research question. Questionnaires will provide a sample on the general SA population in terms of 
demographics, number of loans and payment schedules. The gleaned information from interviews 
and surveys will be appropriately analysed as to provide answers to the research questions. This 
process commences in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4:  Data and Methodology 
This chapter provides a description of the research design and research methodology that will be 
used to analyse the research problem. The data and survey tools used to collect information are 
explained and in addition to this, this chapter provides clarity on the scale used to analyse data, how 
the results should be interpreted and the nature and form of the data. Finally, this section also 
presents the limitations and ethical considerations of the research design and methodology used.  
Qualitative research is carried out when there is a need to understand meanings, beliefs and 
personal experiences. Quantitative research is used to measure variables and produce statistics 
based on the results obtained. This study used both qualitative research methods in the form of an 
interview, and quantitative research methods, in the form of questionnaires, to gather pertinent 
information applicable to the study. 
4.1  Research design and methodology 
Despite the fact that the NCA has been studied in various research projects, the specific research 
problem of interest here has not been adequately studied. For this reason primary data in the form 
of interviews and questionnaires are considered to be best suited to this study and are used 
accordingly. Qualitative and quantitative research methods were chosen to provide a holistic view 
on the research subject in question. This provided both a contextual interpretation and a statistical 
analysis.  
The interviews provided a good starting point to obtain opinions of informed respondents. These 
respondents include officials from banks, the NCR and investment companies. The qualitative 
research methodology was used in that primary data was gathered through interviews to explore 
attitudes, perceptions, behaviours and experiences of stakeholders. The purpose of the 
questionnaire was to gather information from respondents, across all demographics regarding their 
knowledge on the NCA and their debt exposure.  
According to Rea and Parker (2005), there are factors that are present that make sample survey 
research an appropriate method. Firstly adequate secondary data is not available (Rea and Parker, 
2005). Since the growth in unsecured lending has reached its peak, many studies have concentrated 
on this phenomenon but not much research has been conducted specifically on the adherence of 
banks to the NCA and how this affects domestic indebtedness and fragility. The interviews 
conducted were best suited to provide informed opinions on the research problem and the 
questionnaire was used to supplement the information obtained. This primary data forms the basis 
of the research study. 
Secondly there is a desire to generalise findings from small subpopulations to a larger population 
(Rea and Parker, 2005). The questionnaire was intended to provide a sample from the larger 
population as it would not be possible, within the period of time and financial means at the 
researcher’s disposal, to obtain information from the entire South African consumer population. 
Therefore a smaller subpopulation can be used to make inferences regarding the general consensus. 
Thirdly, the target respondent population is accessible (Rea and Parker, 2005). The target 
respondent population of the study includes individuals that are knowledgeable of the South African 
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credit market. These individuals include banking officials, officials from the National Credit Regulator 
and officials from investment companies. The general SA population was used to respond to the 
questionnaire. 
Finally the data to be obtained is of a personal, self-reported nature (Rea and Parker, 2005). 
Although sufficient information is provided from literature reviewed, the interviews provided 
primary data based on respondents’ personal experiences and perceptions. The questionnaire is 
based on fact rather than behaviours and therefore provided definitive numbers for the study. All 
respondents, of both the questionnaire and interview, answered independently and were not 
persuaded to choose any particular response. The respondents to the questionnaire will remain 
anonymous as the questionnaire contained sensitive information and anonymity was assured to 
encouraged honest answers.  
Of the 500 questionnaires distributed to individuals, 223 submitted completed questionnaires. The 
response rate for the questionnaire was 44.6%. 
 Interview requests were sent to the following institutions: 
• Absa Bank 
• Standard Bank 
• Nedbank 
• First National Bank 
• National Credit Regulator 
• Banking Association of South Africa 
• Kutana Investment Corporation 
• First Avenue Investment Management 
• National Empowerment Property Investment Trust 
• 36One Asset Management 
• Small Caps Investments 
• Wonga Financial Services 
• Investec Bank 
Of the 14 interviews requested, 11 were conducted, which provided a response rate of 78.6%. 
The data from the responses to the questionnaires and interviews are analysed and the results are 
utilised to address the research problem. At this juncture it is appropriate to recall the structure of 
the study to be as follows: Firstly an outline of the research problem as well as the purpose of the 
study is provided. The literature review then follows. Next the research question is expanded on, 
followed by the process and design utilised in the collection of data, the analysis of data, reporting of 
the findings and finally the conclusion and recommendation for further research. 
4.2  Data collection 
In this research study, data was collected via two tools namely an interview and a questionnaire 
instrument. Participants were encouraged to respond as honestly as possible and responded on a 
completely voluntary basis. The interview instrument comprises of eight open ended questions 
pertaining to the NCA and unsecured lending. This is used to get views from particular organisations 
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that were directly affected during the period of high growth in unsecured personal loans. Section A 
of the questionnaire instrument is used to gather demographic information from participants, which 
includes five dimensions in terms of age, gender, race, income group and residential demographics 
of participants. Section B is based on an ordinal scale in order to identify the depth of knowledge of 
the NCA by the participant. This section of the questionnaire used a 5 point Likert scale to gauge the 
understanding of the NCA by the participants. The Likert scale showed the degree to which the 
respondent agrees (Agree; Strongly Agree), disagrees (Disagree; Strongly Disagree) or is neutral 
(Neither agree nor disagree) towards the test statement. Section C is based on an ordinal scale 
intended to identify participants’ information about debt.  
All interviewees were contacted prior to the interview to gain permission to conduct the interview. 
In order to get a holistic view, bank officials, officials from regulators and officials from investment 
companies were contacted and the same interview conducted although not all questions were 
applicable to all interviewees. Some interviews were conducted face-to-face while others via email 
where interviewees responded to the questions and forwarded answers via email to the researcher. 
All face-to-face interviews were recorded and treated with confidentiality. The interviews followed a 
logical manner although respondents were given an opportunity to provide additional comments 
that were not part of the original questions. The face-to-face interviews lasted between 30 minutes 
to an hour and were held at the respondents offices based in the Johannesburg area. Follow-ups 
were required in certain instances and the response rate was good. 
Two forms of distribution of the questionnaires to participants were used; namely email and hand 
delivery. Questionnaires were emailed to individuals for completion and emailed back to the 
researcher within the stipulated time period. Others were printed out and handed directly to the 
participant for completion and collected by the researcher. Both methods of distribution were used 
in order to maximise the response rate by participants and both methods of distribution required 
follow-ups by the researcher when the time period stipulated had expired. 
A questionnaire is deemed valid if it allows for accurate data to be collected and reliable if it is 
collected consistently. Validity refers to the extent to which a test measures what it was intended to 
measure. Reliability is concerned with the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure (Ellis 
and Levy, 2008). Both reliability and validity contributed to the quality of the data collected. The 
data collected via the questionnaire approach was deemed appropriate as it allowed the research to 
study a sample in order to infer characteristics about the population. The questionnaires were 
structured in a manner that made reading and completing responses straightforward. The 
questionnaires aimed to obtain information regarding consumers’ demographics as well as financial 
obligations and preferences. All questions were close-ended and provided a number of alternatives 
from which the respondent was instructed to choose. 
4.3  Statistical Analysis 
4.3.1  Interview and questionnaire 
The interview consisted of 8 questions aimed at getting information from each respondent based on 
personal experiences and company policy in terms of their credit qualifications performed, 
consumer education initiatives, the NCA’s relevance to the South African credit market and 
measures to prevent reckless lending. These questions will be elaborated on and the answers from 
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respondents will be summarised and presented in the following chapter. The results are presented 
using tables in order to formulate a general consensus in answers. A copy of the interview is 
attached as Appendix 3. 
The questionnaire consists of 34 questions, divided into 3 sections. The next chapter will elaborate 
on each section, providing an analysis of each section and of the answers supplied by the sample 
population. The results of the questionnaire are analysed using graphical representation such as pie 
charts and line graphs and a tabulation of results. A copy of the questionnaire is attached as 
Appendix 4. 
4.3.2 Interview sample 
The total responses of the interview respondents are provided in a tabulated form in the following 
chapter. The interview sample can be described as the total number of respondents to the interview 
categorised by type of organisation. The interview consisted of a total of 11 responses comprising of 
4 bank officials, 2 officials from a regulator and 5 officials from investment companies. 
4.3.3 Questionnaire sample 
The total responses to the questionnaire are provided in a tabulated form in the next chapter. The 
questionnaire sample can be described as the number of respondents to the questionnaire 
categorised by income levels. All respondents are South African citizens, predominantly from the 
Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces. The questionnaire sample consists of a total of 223 
respondents. Appendix 5 shows the breakdown of the total respondents by: 
• Age 
• Province 
• Gender 
• Race 
• Income categories 
4.4  Constraints 
The list below indicates the constraints encountered in this study. 
• There was limited access to statistics and information in relation to banks’ lending practices. 
• The respondents interviewed represent their respective organisations but may not 
necessarily be representative of the organisations view of the questions asked. 
• Research was limited to banks and no other credit providers, who also had an effect on the 
growth in unsecured lending in South Africa 
• Due to time, practicality and cost constraints, some interviews were emailed to 
respondents. Minimal face-to-face interviews were conducted. 
• Due to time and resource constraints, the sample size is limited; however it was sufficient 
enough to provide consistent and valid findings. 
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4.5  Ethical Considerations 
Since both research tools involved human respondents, ethics played a vital role in this research 
report. All reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that there was no violation of any ethical 
standards. Prior to interviews conducted, the researcher requested permission from the respondent. 
Each respondent, both for the questionnaire and interview, completed each tool on a voluntary 
basis and were not coaxed into choosing a particular answer. These tools were completed by 
respondents in their own time and at their own discretion. Questionnaires were anonymously 
distributed with all information kept confidential. Respondents were requested not to include 
names, surnames, telephone numbers or identity numbers on the questionnaire. This allowed 
respondents to be truthful when answering questions and would potentially improve the quality of 
data from the questionnaire. 
All participants received an invitation to participate in the questionnaire. A copy of this invitation is 
attached as the introductory part of Appendix 3. The invitation contained the following information: 
• The purpose of the study including information stating that the study was for fulfilment of a 
Masters’ degree as well as the event under investigation, 
• Personal details of the researcher, 
• The issue of confidentiality and anonymity, and 
• Indication of the time required to complete the questionnaire. 
All sources of literature utilised in this research study have been referenced using the guidelines 
provided by the Wits Business School (WBS). There was no intentional misrepresentation of findings 
of the research study and all data was reported in its totality. 
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Chapter 5:  Results of the Study 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis conducted and hopefully provides answers to the 
questions of this study as identified in chapter three. The chapter will elaborate on the results 
obtained from the instruments utilised, namely an interview instrument and a questionnaire, to gain 
pertinent data from the sample population. The responses of both the interview and questionnaire 
are examined and elaborated on. The interview comprised of 8 questions associated with the issues 
of the NCA, unsecured lending in South Africa and policies for credit assessment of respondents. The 
interview respondents are categorised by the type of organisation the interviewees represent 
namely, banks, regulators and investment companies. An analysis of each questions’ response by the 
sample is provided. Open-ended questions, which is sometimes viewed as broad and therefore there 
is scope for interpretation by each respondent based on their own experience, knowledge and 
abilities, were asked in the interview. The total number of responses to the questionnaire and the 
number of responses within each income category are presented. The questionnaire is divided into 3 
sections, namely section 1: demographics, section 2: Knowledge on the NCA and section 3: Debt 
information of respondents. 
5.1  Analysis of responses to interview questions 
The interview consisted of 8 questions which were sent to respondents from the following sectors: 
banks, regulators and investment companies. All respondents answered the questions to the best of 
their knowledge, abilities and experience. Table 6 below provides a breakdown of responses by 
sector.  
Table 6: Responses by sector 
Response Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Banks 4 36.36% 4 36.36% 
Regulators 2 18.18% 6 54.54% 
Investment Companies 5 45.45% 11 100.0% 
 
The sample of respondents to the interview represents those individuals that have a good 
knowledge and understanding of the credit industry and the NCA. There were 11 respondents to the 
interview, with the majority being investment companies (45.45%) then followed by banks (36.36%) 
and 18.18% was officials from the National Credit Regulator. A detailed analysis of respondents’ 
answers to each question is shown on table 7 below. 
 
 
 
49 
 
Table 7: Summary of responses per interview question 
Question Banks  Regulator Investment companies 
1. In your opinion what was 
the main driver in the 
increase of unsecured loans 
in South Africa 
The majority of the 4 
banks agreed that post 
the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis, banks had a 
smaller appetite for 
mortgages and greater 
appetite towards 
unsecured lending. 
Other drivers included 
new customers entering 
credit markets and 
lower interest rates. An 
additional driver 
mentioned was the 
strong wage increases, 
which allowed banks to 
take advantage of 
consumers’ improved 
affordability and 
therefore offer larger 
loans with longer terms. 
On the demand side, 
there existed a low 
income community who 
did not have houses or 
cars and used unsecured 
loans to fill this need. On 
the supply side, the 
interest rates prescribed 
by the NCR made 
unsecured credit highly 
attractive to banks which 
fuelled the growth. 
Included in the supply 
side was the change in 
amount and terms caps 
under the NCA. 
All companies agreed 
that the NCA was the 
main driver of 
unsecured credit by 
removal of minimum 
deposits and the 
increasing of maximum 
periods and maximum 
interest rates. On the 
demand side, 
consumers fuelled the 
growth in unsecured 
lending in order to fund 
needs and desires. From 
the supply side, the NCA 
made unsecured 
lending highly 
profitable. 
2. Do you think there is the 
risk of a credit bubble in 
South Africa due to the 
unprecedented growth in 
unsecured loans? Explain 
why? 
The majority of the 4 
banks agreed that there 
was no risk of a credit 
bubble due to the 
following reasons:  
• Stricter lending 
policies in place 
since 2012 
• National Credit 
Amendment Act 
further 
regulated 
affordability 
calculations 
1 bank agreed there is a 
risk but it is limited to 
lower income categories 
that are not credit 
knowledgeable. 
 The NCR’s official 
position is that the 
regulator is not 
examining the growth 
from a systemic risk 
perspective. The 
regulator was however 
concerned with the 
number of people 
moving into default 
categories and with the 
number of impaired 
records as per the Credit 
Bureau Monitor’s 
statistics. The concern is 
that consumers are 
locked in debt contracts 
and used loans for 
consumption purposes. 
The NCR’s mandate is 
restricted to market 
conduct.  
The majority view was 
that the African Bank 
matter was isolated and 
majority of analysts 
believe that there is no 
credit bubble evident in 
the economy. Post 
2012, unsecured credit 
has seen negligible 
growth therefore the 
probability of a bubble 
bursting is minimal as 
lenders have become 
more cautious. There is 
a need, however, for 
lending practices to be 
reviewed. 
3. Specifically referring to 
banks, in South Africa, do you 
think that adequate credit 
qualifications are being 
All banks agreed that 
adequate credit 
qualifications are 
performed. The banks 
The general view is that 
banks do perform 
adequate credit 
qualifications prior to 
Banks, in general, have 
conservative policies, 
although still quite 
aggressive in lending. 
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performed prior to lending to 
consumers? 
used internal scoring 
systems, credit bureaus 
and criteria stipulated 
by the NCA and the 
National Credit 
Amendment Act. 
lending to consumers. 
The NCR did state that it 
was the lower end credit 
providers that tipped the 
scales in terms of 
reckless lending; it was 
not the big banks that 
acted in this fashion. 
Fees and interest 
earned on loans allowed 
credit providers to be 
aggressive and not 
perform adequate 
credit assessments. 
Another element that 
was elaborated on was 
that consumers can be 
dishonest by overstating 
income and 
understating expenses. 
4. What are your initiatives in 
terms of consumer education 
specifically referring to over-
indebtedness? 
Banks have initiatives in 
place – some have 
advanced tools while 
others agree that they 
could enhance current 
systems put in place. 
The NCR’s main 
objective is over-
indebtedness, therefore 
there are numerous 
campaigns being 
organised. A point made 
is that not all cases can 
be resolved at the level 
of debt counsellors. The 
NCR did state that 
consumers are very 
aware of the NCA, NCR, 
debt counselling and 
their rights but they 
don’t want to change 
their habits and 
lifestyles. 
 n/a 
5. In your opinion, has the 
National Credit Act assisted 
or hindered lending in South 
Africa? Explain why? 
The majority of banks 
agreed that the NCA 
assisting lending in 
South Africa by: 
• Protecting 
banks from 
2007/2008, 
financial crisis 
• Increased access 
to credit in SA, 
• Protecting 
consumers and 
credit providers 
and , 
• The 
requirement of 
submitting all 
credit 
agreements to a 
credit bureau, 
which was not 
in effect prior to 
The NCA has assisted 
lending in South Africa, 
which can be attested to 
by the increase in the 
amount of credit 
granted. 
The general view from 
the investment 
companies interviewed 
is that the NCA has 
assisted lending in 
South Africa. The 
National Credit 
Amendment Act 
addresses the NCA’s 
inefficiencies in terms of 
affordability criteria. 
The NCA was also 
helpful in protecting 
South Africa, to an 
extent, during the 
2007/2008 financial 
crisis.  
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the NCA 
(meaning credit 
providers relied 
only on 
consumer 
disclosure). 
A single bank did 
suggest that the NCA 
has hindered lending by 
prescribing maximum 
interest rates and fees 
allowing the industry to 
price at these 
maximums therefore 
increasing the cost to 
consumers. 
6. As a consumer and official 
of your organisation, would 
you say that the National 
Credit Act has provided 
adequate protection against 
reckless lending? Explain 
how? 
The majority of banks 
agreed that the NCA has 
provided adequate 
protection against 
reckless lending but only 
when followed 
prudently and regulated 
in the spirit of good 
faith.  
Banks did note that 
even if the NCA 
provided protection, it 
was necessary to be 
vigilant against 
consumers who are 
dishonest in their 
disclosures. 
A single bank disagreed 
with the NCA providing 
adequate protection 
since the Act was not 
specific enough. 
The NCR agrees that the 
legislature needs to be 
tightened as it is not 
specific enough. The 
National Credit 
Amendment Act offered 
the necessary additions 
to the legislature, 
specifically with regards 
to affordability by adding 
the following conditions:  
• Requesting  
proof of income 
from consumers, 
• Requesting a 
credit bureau 
report on 
consumers, and  
• The consumer 
cannot enter 
into a credit 
agreement with 
a credit report 
older than 7 
days for all 
agreements 
except 
mortgages that 
requires a report 
not older than 
14. 
 n/a 
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7. In your opinion, how can 
the National Credit Act be 
more effective in curbing 
reckless lending practices in 
South Africa? 
Each bank had a 
divergent view. 
The regulation of 
smaller players in the 
market and the National 
Credit Amendment Act 
is an improvement in 
terms of the 
affordability 
requirements. 
Clarification was also 
needed regarding what 
is classified as reckless 
lending. 
The National Credit 
Amendment Act assists 
in the curbing of reckless 
lending activities. 
There needs to be more 
execution and 
enforcement of the 
NCA. 
Another way suggested 
was the decrease in 
maximum interest 
rates, fees and credit 
limit fees, which will 
reduce questionable 
lending. 
The National Credit 
Amendment Act 
addresses most issues 
relevant to assisting 
reckless lending. 
8. What measures do you 
have in place for your 
protection against non-
payment by consumers? 
• Credit life 
insurance is 
made 
compulsory for 
unsecured debt 
(it provides 
cover against 
death, 
permanent and 
temporary 
disability, dread 
disease and 
retrenchment), 
• Collections and 
recoveries 
channels and 
legal channels 
Enhanced scorecards to 
price client according to 
level of risk to better 
predict default. 
 n/a  n/a 
 
This table provides a synopsis of respondents’ answers to the questions asked during interviews.  
5.2  Summary of responses to questionnaires 
5.2.1 Demographic summary: Section A of questionnaire 
Below indicates the demographic information from the sample respondents to the questionnaire 
instrument with regards to age, geographic location, gender, ethnic group and income category. The 
total number of respondents from the sample was 223. See Appendix 5 for tabulated information. 
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Figure 3: Total sample categorised by age 
 
 
Figure 4: Total sample categorised by geographic location within South Africa 
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Figure 5: Total sample categorised by gender 
 
 
Figure 6: Total sample categorised by ethnic group 
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Figure 7: Total sample categorised by income category 
 
From the figures displayed above, it can been noticed that the sample includes a diverse and fair 
spread of consumers from all age groups, both genders, all ethnic groups and all income categories. 
The majority of respondents (almost 98%) are from the two most populated provinces within South 
Africa, Gauteng (almost 61%) and Kwa-zulu Natal (almost 37%).  
5.2.2 NCA knowledge: Section B of questionnaire 
This section provides the entire samples’ responses to Section B of the questionnaire. This section 
used the Likert scale to gauge respondents’ answers. These questions are structured to gain insight 
on the knowledge of respondents to the NCA, over-indebtedness and general credit principles.  
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Table 8: Responses to Section B of questionnaire 
Question   
Strongly 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Total 
1 
The NCA was explained to 
me when I took out any 
product at a bank or 
retailer 15.70% 25.11% 18.39% 24.22% 16.59% 100.00% 
2 
I understand my rights as a 
consumer under the NCA 25.11% 33.63% 18.39% 15.25% 7.62% 100.00% 
3 
I know who to contact 
should a bank or retailer 
not act in a fair manner 25.56% 26.01% 16.59% 17.94% 13.90% 100.00% 
4 
I understand the term 
"over-indebtedness" and 
the consequences it has on 
me 25.56% 26.01% 16.59% 17.94% 13.90% 100.00% 
5 
I understand that I am able 
to use the services of a 
debt counsellor should I 
not be able to pay back my 
debt owed to a bank or 
retailer 33.18% 40.36% 14.80% 6.28% 5.38% 100.00% 
6 
I know that NCA was 
created to protect me, the 
consumer, from unfair and 
illegal practices by banks 
and retailers 36.77% 42.15% 10.31% 5.83% 4.93% 100.00% 
7 
I know that a personal loan 
costs me more than 
vehicle finance 35.87% 32.29% 17.49% 8.52% 5.83% 100.00% 
8 
I know that credit life 
insurance is not 
compulsory for a personal 
loan 28.70% 23.32% 26.46% 13.90% 7.62% 100.00% 
9 
I know that I can shop 
around for better interest 
rates 43.50% 39.46% 9.42% 3.59% 4.04% 100.00% 
10 
I know that if I cannot pay 
back my loan, I will be 
listed on a credit bureau 54.71% 36.32% 6.28% 0.90% 1.79% 100.00% 
 
According to the information provided by the total sample of respondents, all test statements, with 
the exception of number 1, show that more than 50% of respondents either strongly agree and/or 
agree with the test statement presented. Test statement 1, however, provides an equal weighting 
from respondents in terms of strongly agree and/or agree and disagree and/or strongly disagree 
with both comprising of 41% of respondents. The remaining 18% was neutral to the test statement.  
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Test statement 1 focuses on whether the credit provider explained the NCA to the consumer prior to 
taking out a credit product. The analysis provides an equal weighting between strongly agree and/or 
agree and disagree and/or strongly disagree.  
Test statement 2 is directed at the consumers’ knowledge of the NCA. Although the majority of the 
sample (59%) strongly agreed and/or agreed with the test statement, a large portion (41%) was 
either neutral, disagreed or strongly disagreed.  
Test statement 3 is also directed at the consumers’ knowledge of the NCA, more specifically when a 
credit provider does not act in a non-discriminatory manner. The result of this test statement show 
that only 52% of the respondents strongly agreed and/or agreed with the test statement.  
Test statement 4 specifically refers to the concept of over-indebtedness, the consumers’ knowledge 
of it and its consequences on the consumer. The majority (77%) of the respondents strongly agreed 
and/or agreed to the test statement.  
Test statement 5 referred to a debt counsellor’s services. In line with test statement 4’s results, a 
large number of respondents (74%) strongly agreed and/or agreed.  
Test statement 6 focuses on the consumers NCA knowledge, which resulted in 79% strongly agreeing 
and/or agreeing with the test statement. 
Test statement 7 focuses on the consumers’ comprehension of finance costs relating to unsecured 
debt when compared to secured debt. A large portion of respondents (68%) strongly agreed and/or 
agreed to the test statement while 17% remained neutral and 14% disagreed and/or strongly 
disagreed.  
Test statement 8 gives attention to credit life insurance, which according to the NCA is not 
compulsory to a consumer who obtains a personal loan. The results of this test statement show 52% 
strongly agreeing and/or agreeing to the test statement.  
Test statement 9 can be linked to test statement 7, with the focus on a consumers’ comprehension 
of finance costs. Majority of the participants (83%) strongly agreed and/or agreed to the test 
statement.  
Test statement 10 refers to a credit bureau. This test statement received the most strongly agreed 
and/or agreed responses (91%) of the total sample allowing the research to conclude that 
consumers are well aware of judgments and having an adverse credit record.  
5.2.3  Section C of questionnaire 
This section provides the results obtained from the data received from respondents relating to their 
debt usage and preferences. The results will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 6, the 
conclusion of the study. 
5.2.3.1. Total loans issued per income category 
The results of this section provide information around the notion that more credit is granted to 
higher income categories than lower income categories. According to the results of the 
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questionnaire, the majority of loans (71.20%) are issued to respondents’ who earn more than 
R10000 per month (net income). See Figure 8 below.  
Figure 8: Total loans issued per income category 
 
5.2.3.2. Payment methods per income category and per product 
The results of this section offer information of the respondents’ preference with regards to monthly 
payment of credit cards, personal loans and store cards. It is useful to ascertain which income 
category lags with regards to payment of instalments and which income category pays more than 
the monthly instalment due. The results are discussed further in Chapter 6 of this study. 
Table 9: Credit cards 
Income category 
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R10001 - R15000 29.27% 21.95% 48.78% 0.00% 100.00% 
>R15000 38.46% 24.62% 35.38% 1.54% 100.00% 
Total sample 30.50% 29.08% 39.01% 1.42% 100.00% 
 
Table 9 above displays the pattern of repayment, per category of income, of each respondent 
regarding credit card instalments. A result that is derived is that from the total sample of 
respondents, the majority pays either the full amount due or the minimum amount due or as much 
as they can, while a very small number (2 credit card loans out of 141 loans or 1.42%) pay whenever 
they can afford to, resulting in missing instalments. From this 1.42%, one respondent belongs to the 
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R5001 to R10000 income category and the other respondent to the greater than R15000 income 
category. 
Table 10: Personal Loans 
Income category 
I pay more 
than the 
minimum 
monthly 
payment due 
every month 
I pay the minimum 
monthly payment 
due every month 
I pay whenever I 
can, sometimes 
missing a 
months due 
instalment Total 
≤ R5000 60.00% 20.00% 20.00% 100.00% 
R5001 - R10000 35.71% 57.14% 7.14% 100.00% 
R10001 - R15000 34.48% 65.52% 0.00% 100.00% 
>R15000 34.78% 60.87% 4.35% 100.00% 
Total sample 38.16% 56.58% 5.26% 100.00% 
 
Table 10 above displays the pattern of payment of each respondent regarding personal loan 
instalments, per category of income. Another result that is evident is that a small number from the 
total sample chose to pay their instalments due whenever they can afford it, sometimes missing a 
payment (5.26%). Another evident result is that 20% of personal loans in the less than R5000 income 
category chose to pay their personal loan instalment whenever they can, sometimes missing a 
month’s instalment while 60% of consumers in the same income category chose to pay more than 
the minimum monthly instalment due. In all other income categories, the majority of respondents 
chose to pay only the minimum monthly instalment due. 
Table 11: Store Cards 
Income category 
I pay more than 
the minimum 
monthly 
payment due 
every month 
I pay the 
minimum 
monthly 
payment due 
every month 
I pay whenever I can, 
sometimes missing a 
months due 
instalment Total 
≤ R5000 50.00% 40.00% 10.00% 100.00% 
R5001 - R10000 70.00% 23.33% 6.67% 100.00% 
R10001 - R15000 69.57% 30.43% 0.00% 100.00% 
>R15000 63.16% 36.84% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total sample 63.89% 32.64% 3.47% 100.00% 
 
Table 11 above displays the pattern of payment of store card instalments, per category of income. 
The result that is observable is that a small number (5 loans) from the total sample of 144 chose to 
pay their instalments due whenever they can afford it, sometimes missing a payment (3.47%). 
Another evident result is that 10% of personal loans in the less than R5000 income category chose to 
pay their store card instalment whenever they can, sometimes missing a month’s instalment.  
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5.2.3.3 Total debt per income category 
This section provides findings of the total debt, per category of unsecured debt, owed by each 
income category. Figures 9, 10 and 11 shows that the amount of debt obtained from the unsecured 
products (credit cards, personal loans and store cards) are not aligned to respondents’ level of 
income per month.  
Figure 9: Credit card debt 
 
Figure 9 above indicates that in the less than R5000 income category, 100% of respondents with 
credit cards, have total credit card debt of not more than R5000, whereas all other income 
categories indicated a split between all amounts of total credit card debt.  
Figure 10: Personal loan debt 
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Unlike Figure 9, for respondents who earn less than R5000 per month, Figure 10 indicates that 50% 
of respondents have personal loan debt of up to R10000, 40% of respondents have personal loan 
debt of up to R20000 and 10% suggests an amount up to R50000. All other income categories have a 
fair split in the total personal loan debt. Another result from the research reveals that 14.29% of 
respondents who earn between R5001 and R10000 per month own personal loan debt up to 
R100000 and 17.24% of respondents who earn between R10000 and R15000 per month own over 
R100000 personal loan debt. 
Figure 11: Store cards 
 
Store card debt on the other hand is largely dominated to below the amount of R5000 in all income 
groups while still in the less than R5000 income category, 3.57% of the sample have store card debt 
of between R5001 to R10000. In the higher income categories, store card debt of more than R10000 
is evident. 
The results present the following findings for respondents who earn less than R5000 per month: 
• Total credit card debt is an amount up to R5000, 
• Total personal loan debt can be as high as R50000, and 
• Total store card debt is up to an amount of R10000. 
5.2.4 Results for Uses of debt  
This section offers information regarding the uses of credit cards and personal loans by the sample. 
The sample is categorised by income groups, gender, location and age. The results of the section are 
utilised to ascertain what each category of the demographics used the debt product for. 
5.2.4.1. Per income category 
Tables 12 and 13 show the usage of credit cards and personal loans respectively, per category of 
income. 
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Table 12: Usage of credit cards 
Income category 
I use it to 
buy 
essential 
items like 
food, 
petrol etc. 
I only use it when 
necessary, like making 
internet purchases, air 
ticket purchases etc. 
I use it to buy luxury 
items, like brand 
named clothes, 
computer equipment 
etc. Total 
≤ R5000 63.64% 18.18% 18.18% 100.00% 
R5001 - R10000 70.83% 25.00% 4.17% 100.00% 
R10001 - R15000 31.71% 58.54% 9.76% 100.00% 
>R15000 33.85% 50.77% 15.38% 100.00% 
Total sample 41.84% 46.10% 12.06% 100.00% 
 
The results of Table 12 above indicates that the majority (46.10%) of credit card debt holders use 
their cards to purchase luxury items while 41.84% use their cards for essential items like food and 
travel. The sample also shows that a majority of respondents (63.64%) in the less than R10000 
income category used credit cards to buy essential items like food and petrol while majority of 
respondents from the higher than R10000 income categories used credit cards for purchasing items 
that could not be bought with cash. 
Table 13: Usage of personal loans 
Income 
category 
I used my 
personal 
loan to help 
me to pay 
for expenses 
when I did 
not have 
enough cash 
to pay 
I used my 
personal loan 
to make 
improvements 
on my home 
(building 
improvements 
and general 
caretaking of 
home) 
I used my 
personal 
loan to buy 
a car 
I used my 
personal loan 
to consolidate 
all my debt in 
order to pay 
one monthly 
instalment 
I used my 
personal 
loan to pay 
for the 
deposit on 
my house Total 
≤ R5000 50.00% 10.00% 0.00% 40.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
R5001 - R10000 28.57% 42.86% 7.14% 14.29% 7.14% 100.00% 
R10001 - 
R15000 37.93% 31.03% 6.90% 20.69% 3.45% 100.00% 
>R15000 30.43% 26.09% 8.70% 30.43% 4.35% 100.00% 
Total sample 35.53% 28.95% 6.58% 25.00% 3.95% 100.00% 
 
The major response evident from the results according to Table 13 above reveals that consumers 
with personal loan debt have used loans to supplement shortages in income (35.53%), while this is 
closely followed by the use of personal loans for building improvements (28.95%). Another outcome 
which supports literature is that personal loans are used for debt consolidation (25%). Respondents 
from the less than R5000 income category favoured using the personal loans for consumption 
purposes and debt consolidation, while none used their loans to buy cars or pay for deposits on 
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houses. The other income categories follow the general trend of the sample where the personal 
loans are used either for consumption purposes, home improvements or debt consolidation. 
5.2.4.2 Debt category per gender 
Tables 14 and 15 provide results on usage of credit cards and personal loans per gender category. 
Table 14: Credit cards 
Gender 
I use it to buy 
essential items 
like food, petrol 
etc. 
I only use it when 
necessary, like making 
internet purchases, air 
ticket purchases etc. 
I use it to buy luxury 
items like, brand 
named clothes, 
computer equipment 
etc. Total 
Male 52.54% 32.20% 15.25% 100.00% 
Female 34.15% 56.10% 9.76% 100.00% 
Total sample 41.84% 46.10% 12.06% 100.00% 
 
Table 15: Personal loans 
Gender 
I used my 
personal 
loan to help 
me to pay 
expenses 
when I did 
not have 
enough cash 
to pay 
I used my 
personal loan 
to make 
improvements 
on my home 
(building 
improvements 
and general 
caretaking of 
home) 
I used my 
personal 
loan to buy 
a car 
I used my 
personal loan 
to consolidate 
all my debt in 
order to pay 
one monthly 
instalment 
I used my 
personal 
loan to pay 
for the 
deposit on 
my house Total 
Male 36.11% 27.78% 11.11% 25.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Female 35.00% 30.00% 2.50% 25.00% 7.50% 100.00% 
Total sample 35.53% 28.95% 6.58% 25.00% 3.95% 100.00% 
 
Tables 14 and 15, both show that females have more credit card and personal loan debt than males, 
though the ratio in the personal loan category is negligible. The majority of both genders use of 
personal loans was for consumption purposes, while closely followed by home improvements and 
debt consolidation.  
5.2.4.3 Debt category per province 
Tables 16 and 17 display the respondents preferred usage of credit cards and personal loans 
respectively, per province they reside in.  
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Table 16: Credit cards 
Province 
I use it to 
buy essential 
items, like 
food, petrol 
etc. 
I only use it when 
necessary, like making 
internet purchases, air 
ticket purchases etc. 
I use it to buy luxury 
items like brand named 
clothes, computer 
equipment etc. Total 
Gauteng 38.75% 48.75% 12.50% 100.00% 
Kwazulu-Natal 44.07% 44.07% 11.86% 100.00% 
Western cape 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Eastern Cape 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Northern Cape 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mpumalanga 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Free State 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
North West 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Limpopo 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total sample 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
 
Table 16 above shows that almost 50% of respondents from both Gauteng and Kwa-zulu Natal 
provinces used their credit cards for necessary purchases that could not be made with cash. 
Although this is a large amount, it is closely followed by respondents, in both provinces, using their 
credit cards to make essential purchases that could be made with cash, yet made on credit.13 
Table 17: Personal loans 
Province 
I used my 
personal 
loan to help 
me to pay 
expenses 
when I did 
not have 
enough cash 
to pay 
I used my 
personal loan to 
make 
improvements on 
my home (building 
improvements 
and general 
caretaking of 
home) 
I used my 
personal 
loan to by a 
car 
I used my 
personal loan 
to consolidate 
all my debt in 
order to pay 
one monthly 
instalment 
I used my 
personal 
loan o pay 
for the 
deposit on 
my house Total 
Gauteng 29.79% 29.79% 4.26% 29.79% 6.38% 100.00% 
Kwazulu-Natal 44.44% 25.93% 11.11% 18.52% 0.00% 100.00% 
Western cape 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Eastern Cape 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Northern Cape 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mpumalanga 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Free State 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
North West 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Limpopo 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total sample 35.53% 28.95% 6.58% 25.00% 3.95% 100.00% 
                                                          
13 The provinces of the Free State and Limpopo both show results of 100%. This is due to the very small 
number of respondents from these provinces which have been included in the sample. 
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When compared to Gauteng’s respondents, Kwa-zulu Natal’s sample shows a bias towards using 
personal loans for consumption purposes (44.44%). Gauteng is evenly favoured with using personal 
loans for consumption, home improvements and consolidation at 29.79% each. 
5.4.2.4 Debt category per age category 
Tables 18 and 19 give information on the usage of credit cards and personal loans, per age category. 
Table 18: Credit cards 
Category 
I use it to 
buy essential 
items like 
food, petrol 
etc. 
I only use it when necessary 
like making internet 
purchases, air ticket 
purchases etc. 
I use it to buy luxury 
items like brand 
named clothes, 
computer equipment 
etc. Total 
≤ 24 years 12.50% 62.50% 25.00% 100.00% 
25-29 years 48.28% 34.48% 17.24% 100.00% 
30-39 years 42.11% 52.63% 5.26% 100.00% 
40-49 years 36.36% 45.45% 18.18% 100.00% 
≥ 50 years 57.14% 35.71% 7.14% 100.00% 
Total sample 41.84% 46.10% 12.06% 100.00% 
 
Table 18 above shows that 62.50% of respondents below the age of 25 years use their credit cards 
for making necessary purchases. All other age categories are split fairly between using credit cards to 
make essential purchases and using credit cards to make necessary purchases. Also evident is that a 
minority number of respondents from all ages use credit cards to buy luxury goods. 
Table 19: Personal loans 
Category 
I used my 
personal 
loan to help 
me to pay 
expenses 
when I did 
not have 
enough cash 
to pay 
I used my 
personal loan 
to make 
improvements 
on my home 
(building 
improvements 
and general 
caretaking of 
home) 
I used my 
personal 
loan to by a 
car 
I used my 
personal loan 
to consolidate 
all my debt in 
order to pay 
one monthly 
instalment 
I used my 
personal 
loan o pay 
for the 
deposit on 
my house Total 
≤ 24 years 66.67% 16.67% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
25-29 years 42.86% 14.29% 7.14% 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 
30-39 years 30.56% 30.56% 2.78% 30.56% 5.56% 100.00% 
40-49 years 22.22% 44.44% 11.11% 16.67% 5.56% 100.00% 
≥ 50 years 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total sample 35.53% 28.95% 6.58% 25.00% 3.95% 100.00% 
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Table 19 shows that majority of consumers younger than 30 years used personal loans to fund 
deficits in cash whereas older respondents used personal loans for either deficits in cash, home 
improvements or debt consolidation.  
5.2.5 Results of debt exposure per gender 
The figures presented below provide results on the total debt owed, per gender category.   
Figure 12: Credit cards per gender   Figure 13: Personal loans per gender 
 
Figure 14: Store cards per gender   Figure 15: Housing loans per gender 
 
Figure 16: Car loans per gender 
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Figures 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 above illustrate that in each category of credit product, namely credit 
cards; personal loans; store cards; housing loans and car finance loans, female respondents 
dominate each debt usage. 
5.2.6 Results of each income category categorised by race and total income 
Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20 below illustrate the type of debt predominantly shared by a race group in a 
specific category of income. These results can provide information with regards to which race group 
in South Africa might be the most indebted, and which product is favoured by each race group. 
Figure 17: Income category: less than R5000 
 
Figure 17 above shows that credit card debt, personal loan debt and store card debt is 
predominantly owed by Africans in the less than R5000 income category. Secured debt (house and 
car debt) is shared between all ethnic groups from the sample of respondents.  
Figure 18: Income category: R5001 – R10000 
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Figure 18 above indicates that all races in the R5001 to R10000 income category contribute to the 
total debt obligation in each category of debt. 
Figure 19: Income category: R10001 – R15000 
 
Figure 19 above reveals that Indians dominate all categories of debt in the R10001 to R15000 
income category. 
Figure 20: Income category: greater than R15000 
 
In the greater than R15000 category of income, Figure 20 above indicates that across all classes of 
debt, all races namely Africans, Indians, Whites and Coloureds share a fair portion. 
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5.2.7 Unsolicited communication 
Unsolicited communication refers to emails, smses and calls received by respondents inviting the 
respondent to take up a pre-approved loan. According to the National Credit Act, this type of action 
is illegal, yet from the number of responses below, it can be gathered that this action is still 
practiced.  
Figure 21: Number of total respondents receiving unsolicited pre-approved loans 
 
 
Figure 21 shows a large portion (77.58%) of total respondents received unsolicited communication 
via emails, smses or calls.  
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 was adopted by the South African government on 1 June 2006. 
The Act’s main objective was to level the playing field amongst consumers and credit providers. It 
therefore regulates the credit industry by imposing regulations which credit providers have to abide 
by. The NCA introduced a framework within which credit providers need to operate with regards to 
how consumers must be treated, fees and maximum interest rates imposed and to prevent reckless 
lending. The act also introduced the concept of debt counsellors, who came into existence with the 
sole purpose of assisting over-indebted consumers.  
This study investigates the adherence by banks, in particular, to the NCA, specifically concerning its 
effect on domestic indebtedness and fragility. The research is especially concerned with the growth 
of unsecured lending in South Africa and whether the NCA inadvertently fuelled this growth with the 
regulations it imposed on banks, who are the largest credit providers and who have the largest 
disbursements of unsecured loans in South Africa. The research is also concerned with consumer 
over-indebtedness and the role banks played in this subject. All stakeholders, including the South 
African government, regulators, credit providers and consumers have been impacted by the growth 
in unsecured lending. The insight provided in this research should be of particular importance to 
regulators and governmental organisations, which could use the findings of the study to prevent or 
circumvent future potential predicaments of this nature. This chapter provides the conclusion to the 
research report, including a summary of the major findings from the data gathering instruments and 
review approaches used to examine the research issues and suggestions for further research. 
6.1  Summary of findings 
6.1.1 Interview summary 
Question Summary of answers 
1. In your opinion what 
was the main driver in 
the increase of 
unsecured loans in 
South Africa? 
From a supply perspective, all respondents concluded that the main driver 
of the increase in growth in unsecured debt in South Africa was the ability 
for credit providers, under the enforcement of the NCA, to price 
unsecured loans at much higher margins than other credit products and 
to provide higher loan amounts over longer terms. This made unsecured 
credit a more profitable product than other forms of credit. From a 
demand perspective, consumers were also a driver in unsecured credit 
since they had a need to supplement disposable income. These loans 
were used for consumption purposes and for the lower income 
consumers who did not fit the profile to afford assets, were used to 
purchases cars or houses. The resultant was that the growth in unsecured 
loans in South Africa was due to both a supply-push by credit providers 
and demand-pull by consumer. 
2. Do you think there is 
the risk of a credit 
bubble in South Africa 
due to the 
unprecedented growth 
in unsecured loans? 
Explain why? 
The majority of banks and investment companies concurred that there 
was no risk of a credit bubble however there was a need to exercise 
caution due to the growth in unsecured loans observed. The NCR also 
expressed concern over the number of credit profiles of consumers 
showing impaired records but the NCR’s official position is on market 
conduct and not systemic risk. Although there is minimal concern around 
a credit bubble developing the respondents all agreed that more caution 
should be taken by both credit providers and consumers. If the trend 
71 
 
persistently continues and more consumers reported with impaired 
records, the likelihood of a bubble emerging is eminent. 
3. Specifically referring 
to banks, in South 
Africa, do you think 
that adequate credit 
qualifications are being 
performed prior to 
lending to consumers? 
All respondents agreed that banks perform adequate credit ratings on 
consumers applying for loans. Due to the systems in place (internal score 
cards and credit bureau reports) banks can almost accurately profile a 
consumer, provided that the consumers is honest in his/her disclosure. 
The researcher was able to conclude that banks do perform adequate 
credit scoring prior to granting a loan. 
4. What are your 
initiatives in terms of 
consumer education 
specifically referring to 
over-indebtedness? 
Banks have various tools in place for consumer education initiatives, 
although some are more advanced tools than others. The NCR also has 
various educational initiatives centered on over-indebtedness. The 
consumer is able to get information from various sources on credit and 
over-indebtedness but it’s the consumer who needs to want to change 
their lifestyle in order to not become over-indebted. 
5. In your opinion, has 
the National Credit Act 
assisted or hindered 
lending in South Africa? 
Explain why? 
All respondents concurred that the NCA has assisted lending in South 
Africa. The NCA’s main objective is to make credit accessible the many 
unbanked South Africans, which, according to the total credit disbursed 
(as per the CCMR statistics), it has. 
6. As a consumer and 
official of your 
organisation, would you 
say that the National 
Credit Act has provided 
adequate protection 
against reckless 
lending? Explain how? 
Both respondents to this question agreed that the NCA did provide 
adequate protection to the consumer against reckless lending practices, 
but due to loopholes in the Act, there were ways to circumvent this. The 
National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 therefore offered further 
regulations to assist in curbing reckless lending and provide more 
stringent laws which credit providers need to abide by. 
7. In your opinion, how 
can the National Credit 
Act be more effective in 
curbing reckless lending 
practices in South 
Africa? 
The respondents to this question agreed on the following ways that the 
NCA could be more effective in curbing reckless lending practices: 
• Introduction and strict regulation and enforcement of the 
National Credit Amendment Act and, 
• Regulation of smaller credit providers who tended to be more 
reckless in lending than banks. 
Respondents also suggested that the NCR lower maximum interest rates 
and fees applicable to credit agreements, particularly unsecured debt. 
This will ensure lenders are stricter in lending. 
8. What measures do 
you have in place for 
your protection against 
non-payment by 
consumers? 
This question was only applicable to banks that had various instruments in 
place to protect against non-payment by consumers. The result also 
included credit life insurance, which banks made compulsory to 
consumers who applied for unsecured loans. 
 
6.1.2 Questionnaire summary 
The questionnaire comprised of 3 sections namely demographic information, knowledge of the NCA 
and respondents loan information and behaviour. 
Section A of the questionnaire shows that the sample represented a satisfactory number of 
respondents from each age category, gender, ethnic group and income category. Due to timing 
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constraints experienced, the geographic locations were restricted to respondents from the two 
largest provinces in South Africa namely, Gauteng and Kwa-zulu Natal; although a minority (2%) did 
indicate other provinces as their geographic location. Statistics South Africa (2011) stated that 
Gauteng is the most densely populated province in South Africa, with 12.2 million people, and Kwa-
zulu Natal is the second most densely populated province with 10.2 million people. The researcher 
maintains that this sample therefore provides a representative set of inferences about the general 
South African consumer. 
Section B provided 10 test statements on the NCA. Respondents had to choose either strongly agree, 
agree, neither, disagree or strongly disagree to each test statement. The results of this section show 
that more than 50% of all respondents either strongly agreed or agreed to test statements two to 
ten. Each test statement referred to the respondents’ knowledge of the NCA. The results of test 
statements two to ten demonstrates that 1 out of every 2 consumers is fairly knowledgeable on the 
NCA, over-indebtedness, finance costs, debt counselling and credit bureau information. The 
perception from these test statements is that most consumers are conversant on credit matters. 
Test statement 1 was the only test statement that resulted in equally divergent views. The test 
statement specifically referred to the NCA being explained to a consumer by a credit provider prior 
to a loan being granted. These divergent views led the researcher to conclude that in some instances 
credit providers do explain the NCA to the consumer and in other instances, the Act is not explained. 
Test statements 2, 3 and 6 of section B of the questionnaire focused on the respondent’s knowledge 
of the NCA. Test statement 6 showed more than 70% of respondents either strongly agreeing or 
agreeing to the test statement, while test statements 2 and 3 have just over 50% of respondents 
either strongly agreeing or agreeing. The perception is that there still exists a large population of 
consumers who are not fully conversant of the principles of the NCA. 
Test statements 4 and 5 refer to the concept of over-indebtedness and debt counselling, 
respectively. Both test statements received more than 70% of respondents either strongly agreeing 
or agreeing to it. This was perceived as an encouraging response and showed that the majority of 
South Africans are aware of these concepts. 
Test statements 7 and 9 focuses on the respondents’ knowledge of finance costs associated with 
credit agreements. Test statement 7 refers to a personal loan costing more than vehicle finance, of 
which 68% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed to the test statement. Although a large 
portion of respondents strongly agreed and/or agreed to the test statement, 14% either strongly 
disagreed or disagreed to the statement. This demonstrated that a small minority was still unaware 
of the true cost of an unsecured loan. Test statement 9 referred to the ability of a consumer to shop 
around for better interest rates. The majority of the sample either strongly agreed or agreed to the 
test statement, reinforcing that consumers are knowledgeable about credit matters, although in 
some instances, only certain information. 
Test statement 8 referred to credit life insurance, which is a very contentious topic in the credit 
market, particularly the unsecured credit market. According to the NCA, credit life insurance is not a 
compulsory product to be sold when obtaining a personal loan, yet both the interview results and 
questionnaire results contradict this. The results showed that only 22% and 20%, respectively, 
strongly disagreed and/or disagreed or were neutral to the test statement. This led to the conclusion 
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that a large portion of the sample, and by inference, South African consumers, was misled into 
believing that credit life insurance was a compulsory condition when applying or being granted a 
personal loan. This conclusion, coupled with the banks interviewed who stated that they insisted on 
credit life insurance, showed that the Act was been manipulated according to internal bank policies 
and not regulations. Banks made credit life insurance a condition for granting credit, which assisted 
in not only reducing risks associated with personal loans but also bulking up profits from the product 
for banks. 
Test statement 10 refers to a credit bureau. Majority of respondents (91%) either strongly agreed 
and/or agreed to the test statement. This is consistent with literature which describes most 
consumers as being aware of the consequences when listed on a credit bureau. The results also 
prove that consumer efforts by the NCR and debt counsellors are successful. 
Section C of the questionnaire was intended to elicit specific debt information from respondents. 
The results are categorised according to income categories, usages of debt, gender groups and 
ethnic groups. From the results found, various conclusions can be drawn and inferences made about 
the South African credit consumer.  
Firstly the results found that more than 70% of loans were issued to respondents who earned 
income of more than R10000 per month. This result has two sides that are applicable. In one 
instance this could be the case because from sample consisted of more respondents who earned 
over R10000 than under R10000 income per month, or from the under R10000 income category, the 
respondents did not own debt. In the other instance, if the inference is made to the South African 
consumer, it would be justified to deduce that higher income earners are the income group being 
targeted and approved loans by credit providers. Lower income earners are not granted credit due 
to affordability or due to credit providers focusing on higher income earners to their exclusion from 
consideration. 
Another deduction that can be made from the results is that the majority of respondents pay credit 
card, personal loan and store card debt on time and either pay the minimum or more than the 
minimum instalment due. The majority of respondents who do tend to miss an instalment in any one 
of the debt categories listed above, earn below R10000 income per month. This result can be 
perceived as lower income categories being over-indebted and not having sufficient income to 
support the levels of debt. 
The results also indicated that lower income earners have categorically higher personal loan debt 
that is not in proportion to their levels of income earned. Credit card and store card debt can be 
largely justified to levels of income in this category. These results can be two fold, where firstly 
credit providers could have used joint income from a household to extend personal loan debt to an 
individual, or a more reasonable explanation is that credit providers were not accurately assessing 
personal loan applications or consumers were dishonest in their disclosures which resulted in higher 
loan amounts, probably over longer terms, to be granted.  
When income categories are compared in conjunction with uses of credit cards, it was found that 
respondents who earned less than R10000 per month used credit cards for essential purchases, that 
is in lieu of cash and those respondents who earned in the excess of R10000 per month used credit 
cards for necessary purchases, luxury purchases as well as for essentials. Personal loan debt uses are 
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distributed differently among the income groups yet concentrate around three main uses namely, 
paying for expenses where there is a shortfall in cash, home improvements and debt consolidation. 
The lowest income category validates literature reviewed on the subject who referred to personal 
loans being used dominantly to supplement shortfalls in income and to consolidate debt. The result 
also allows the researcher to conclude that consumers do use personal loan debt for consumption 
purposes, as confirmed by various sources of literature.  
6.2  Key takeaways 
This study’s aim was to investigate the role the NCA has played in the creation of an unsecured 
lending bubble in South Africa. In addition to this objective, the study aimed to find the key drivers 
of unsecured credit, the reason for unsecured credit being the preferred product offered by banks, 
and whether adequate credit assessments were conducted by banks prior to lending to consumers. 
From the literature reviewed and the instruments utilised to obtain information, a few key findings 
were discovered. One of the major drivers in the unsecured loan debt market was the maximum 
interest rates allowed under the NCA. This permitted banks to price at higher margins thereby 
achieving higher levels of profits than if other types of credit were granted. Another key driver to 
unsecured lending in South Africa was the need by consumers to supplement income. These two 
drivers, acting in unison, drove the unsecured credit book to unprecedented levels and received 
local and international attention. Although literature and interviews did confirm that there was no 
concern of a credit bubble bursting, both sources did confirm the need to exercise caution by both 
credit providers and consumers.  
From an affordability assessments’ perspective, although conclusions corroborate that banks 
perform adequate credit assessments on consumers prior to lending, the sample respondents under 
the R10000 income categories showed unjustifiable debt levels. This could mean that loans were 
obtained from sources other than the banks interviewed or that credit assessments allowed high 
value loans to consumers with insufficient levels of income, due to other factors taken into 
consideration. 
There is a strong perception that the NCA has been beneficial in the credit industry. It has allowed 
access to credit by many South Africans who previously did not have access to the credit market, and 
thereby assist in enhancing the lives of these South Africans. Finally the study was also able to 
highlight weaknesses in the Act, which has already largely been addressed in the National Credit 
Amendment Act, although not entirely. The credit life insurance subject is still controversial and has 
not been adequately addressed by the Act. In addition to this, the debt review process in SA needs 
review and alignment in order for it to work as it was intended, especially with the growing number 
of credit records becoming adverse. This concept is important for future consumer credit health and 
wellbeing.  
6.3  Recommendations for further studies 
The findings of this research paper suggest that there are opportunities within the context of the 
NCA to conduct further research that may be beneficial to interested parties. Although the NCA has 
been in existence for a few years, there are important loopholes that can be addressed via further 
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research. The National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 does bring forward significant 
improvement but continuous research will help ensure continual efficiency and effectiveness.  
This research was based on the four big banks in South Africa, namely Absa Bank, First National 
Bank, Nedbank and Standard Bank. An opportunity exists to utilise data of all credit providers within 
the credit industry in order to ascertain the impact other credit providers have on the credit 
industry. Not all credit providers within SA are registered with the NCR. The introduction of the total 
number of credit providers should provide more insight in terms of credit assessment policies, 
reckless lending practices and additional disbursements, which is currently unavailable. 
Since most consumers are not aware, off hand, of the rates of interest they pay on debt, a further 
study should compare the interest rates paid on secured and unsecured debt segregated by income 
categories, age groups, genders, ethnic groups and geographic locations. This examination could 
possibly supply information on the basis utilised by credit providers to ascertain interest rates 
applicable to consumers and whether these interest rates are solely obtained using risk based 
pricing methodology or whether there are other factors that play a role in pricing of credit 
agreements. 
A particularly impactful study would be to investigate the impact of a decrease in the maximum 
interest rates and fees imposed by the NCA. The investigation could measure the impact a decrease 
would have on the South African credit industry, specifically with regards to access to credit. The 
challenge that would be faced by the South African government would be to, while reducing interest 
rates and fees applicable to loans, still allow the credit market to remain accessible by making it 
profitable to credit providers to extend credit. The trade-off will be noteworthy. 
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Appendix 1: Purposes of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
 
  
 The purposes of the National Credit Act (2005) 
The preamble to the National Credit Act provides that the main purpose of this Act is: 
• To promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit, and for that 
purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit and improved standards of consumer 
information; 
• To promote black economic empowerment and ownership in the consumer credit industry; 
• To prohibit certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practises; 
• To promote responsible credit granting and use , and for that purpose to prohibit reckless credit granting; 
• To provide for debt re-organisation in cases of over-indebtedness; 
• To regulate credit information; 
• To provide for registration of credit bureaux, credit providers and debt counselling services; 
• To establish national norms and standards relating to consumer credit; 
• To promote a consistent enforcement framework relating to consumer credit; 
• To establish the National Credit Regulator and the National Consumer Tribunal; to the Usury Act (1968) 
and the Credit Agreements Act (1980); and 
• To provide for related incidental matters 
Section 3 of the National Credit Act sets out all the specific objectives of the Act: 
The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South African, promote a 
fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
industry, and to protect consumers, by: 
a) Promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, and in particular to 
those who have historically been unable to access credit under sustainable market conditions; 
b) Ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit providers; 
c) Promoting responsibility in the credit market by: 
i. Encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness, and fulfilment of financial 
obligations by consumers; and 
ii. Discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers, and contractual default by consumers; 
d) Promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and responsibilities of credit 
providers and consumers; 
e) Addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers and credit providers by: 
i. Providing consumers with education about credit and consumer rights; 
ii. Providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised information in order to make 
informed choices; and 
iii. Providing consumers with protection from deception, and from unfair or fraudulent conduct by 
credit providers and credit bureaux; 
f) Improving consumer credit information and reporting, and regulating credit bureaux; 
g) Addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing mechanisms for resolving 
over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial 
obligation; 
h) Providing for consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of disputes arising from credit 
agreements; and 
i) Providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, enforcement and judgment, 
which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligations under credit 
agreements. 
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Appendix 2: Credit Industry Code of Conduct to Combat Over-indebtedness in 
terms of section 48 (1) (b) of the National Credit Act (NCA) 
1.                Preamble 
1.1 The Code to combat over-indebtedness contains valuable provisions aimed at (a) 
preventing over-indebtedness and (b) measures for consumers who are experiencing 
financial difficulties due to over-indebtedness and are entitled to enter the statutory 
debt counselling process under the NCA. 
1.2 As a credit provider, we hereby subscribe to this code. We recognise that while the 
majority of our consumers incur debt in a responsible and sustainable manner, a certain 
number of consumers may from time to time experience financial difficulties resulting in 
over-indebtedness. 
1.3 We undertake to implement a range of measures to ensure that we comply with the 
provisions of the NCA in respect of applications for credit and the statutory debt review 
in other that (a) consumers cannot afford credit are not granted credit and (b) debt 
review cases are expeditiously resolved. 
1.4 We recognise that consumers should not be provided with credit unless they are able to 
afford the credit for which they have applied. We recognise that where possible, over-
indebted consumers should preferably obtain relief through consensual arrangements 
with their credit providers matched by reciprocal commitments from their side with the 
aim to allow them to recover from their financial difficulties. The achievement of both of 
these aims constitutes the primary objectives in this Code. 
 
2.                Our commitments 
2.1.  To prevent over-indebtedness: 
We will: 
2.1.1. Lend responsibly to our consumers to avoid over-indebtedness from occurring 
where possible, subject to the consumer’s comprehensive and truthful participation 
in the application process 
2.1.2. Take all internal consumer credit performance information as well as all the 
information available on credit bureaus into consideration when granting credit to 
consumers.  
2.1.3. Diligently and accurately report to the credit bureaus and, once established, the 
National Register of Credit Agreements envisaged in section 69 of the NCA in the 
prescribed manner and form. 
2.1.4. Conduct an affordability assessment on each credit application or extension thereof. 
2.1.5  Ensure that affordability assessments consider all the financial means and 
obligations of the consumers and shall collaborate with registered credit bureaux to 
ensure that additional datasets are made available to credit bureaux for use by 
credit providers in affordability assessments. 
2.1.6. Take into consideration the affordability assessment guidelines issued by the NCR 
from time to time when conducting affordability assessments. 
2.2  To maintain relationships with other stakeholders in the statutory debt review 
process 
We will: 
2.2.1. Support and co-operate fully with the NCR, debt counsellors and payment 
distribution agencies to facilitate agreement and co-operation amongst the 
respective stakeholders. 
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2.2.2. Make every effort in good faith to engage with debt counsellors and payment 
distribution agencies in order to resolve operational difficulties that may occur in 
implementing this Code. 
2.2.3. Act co-operatively, fairly and reasonably in liaising with a consumer and a debt 
counsellor representing the consumer in the debt review process. 
2.3 To establish and implement internal policies and resources 
We will: 
2.3.1.  Ensure that the necessary measures are put in place in our businesses to facilitate 
the implementation of our commitments under this Code, including: 
2.3.1.1. Having in place clear internal policies and procedures regarding the 
treatment of debt review applications; 
2.3.1.2. Having a single appropriate mandated point of contact in our business with 
adequate resources to deal with all such matters; 
2.3.1.3. Ensuring that the policies and procedures our lawyers must follow reflect 
our commitments set out in this Code; 
2.3.1.4. Ensuring that our employees and representatives adhere to our 
commitments set out in this Code. 
2.3.2. Diligently implement all the terms and consequential payment arrangement 
adjustments of any debt restructuring agreements to relieve over-indebtedness 
reached in the statutory debt counselling process where the debt counsellor has 
complied with all relevant legal and regulatory requirements. 
2.3.3. Ensure that our employees are aware of procedures for handling complaints and 
disputes and the debt counselling processes to resolve financial distress due to over-
indebtedness. 
2.3.4. Not terminate debt review proceedings or resort to litigation in respect of the 
affected credit agreements whilst consumers acting in good faith, have lodged 
complaints with the NCR. 
2.4. To establish and implement complaint and dispute resolution policies and 
procedures 
We will: 
2.4.1. Have internal policies and procedures to resolve consumer complaints and disputes 
in accordance with the NCA. 
2.4.2. If a consumer or debt counsellor (on behalf of the consumer) lodges a complaint, we 
will endeavour to resolve the complaint ourselves. If they are not satisfied with the 
outcome, we will advise them to refer the complaint to the NCR. 
2.5. To create and support consumer awareness and education initiatives 
We will: 
2.5.1. Make available through our websites, branch offices and periodically with 
statements to our consumers, educational material to: 
 2.5.1.1. Improve our consumers’ ability to manage their finances; 
 2.5.1.2. Assist our consumers to avoid over-indebtedness; 
 2.5.1.3. Warm them about the negative consequences of taking on too much credit; 
 2.5.1.4. Inform them about their right to apply for debt counselling when they 
appear to be over-indebted; 
2.5.1.5. Support national and/or joint industry initiatives, as well as initiatives by 
independent or non-profit organisations aimed at promoting consumer 
education and financial literacy; 
2.5.1.6. Periodically engage independent researchers to measure the levels of 
consumer awareness in respect of the matters referred to in this section. 
      2.6  Reporting 
We will report annually to the NCR on: 
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2.6.1 The initiatives that we have undertaken and supported as well as the resources 
allocated to    promote consumer awareness and education. 
     2.6.2  Statistical information on: 
  2.6.2.1. The number of debt re-arrangement proposals received; 
  2.6.2.2. The number of proposals accepted and rejected respectively, broken down 
according to type of credit transaction involved;  
 2.6.2.3. The number of debt reviews terminated and the reasons for the 
termination; 
 2.6.2.4. The number of debt review orders rescinded and the reasons for the 
rescission. 
      2.6.3. Our progress in regard to carrying out our obligations under this Code. 
 
3.  Monitoring and compliance 
     3.1. The NCR will monitor the implementation of and compliance with the Code. 
 
4.  Review of the Code 
     4.1 The NCR will review this Code as and when it considers it appropriate to do so. 
 
5.  Date of Commencement 
     5.1 This code shall come into effect on the 1st May 2013 and replaces the current code. 
 
6. Definitions 
In this code, the following expressions have the following meanings: 
“code” means this Credit Provider’s Code of Conduct to combat over-indebtedness. 
“Consumer” has the meaning given to it in section 1 of the NCA. 
“Credit Provider” means a registered Credit Provider as defined in section 1 of the NCA. 
“NCA” means the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
“NCR” means the National Credit Regulator as established in terms of the NCA. 
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Appendix 3: Interview questions 
1. In your opinion what was the main driver in the increase of unsecured loans in South Africa? 
2. Do you think that there is the risk of a credit bubble in South Africa due to the 
unprecedented growth in unsecured loans? Explain why? 
3. Specifically referring to banks in South Africa, do you think that adequate credit 
qualifications are being performed prior to lending to consumers? 
4. What are your initiatives in terms of consumer education specifically referring to over 
indebtedness? 
5. In your opinion, has the National Credit Act assisted or hindered lending in South Africa? 
Explain why? 
6. As a consumer and official of your organisation, would you say that the national credit act 
has provided adequate protection against reckless lending? Explain how? 
7. In your opinion how can the National Credit Act be more effective in curbing reckless lending 
practices in South Africa? 
8. What measures do you have in place for your protection against non-payment by 
consumers? 
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Appendix 4: Copy of questionnaire 
Dear Participant,  
My name is Virushka Kanniah and I am a master’s student at Wits Business School. For completion of 
my qualification, I am required to submit a thesis comprising of a relevant topic in finance. For my 
research component I am examining the adherence by the banks in South Africa to the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) and the National Credit Act Amendment Bill gazetted 29 May 2013, 
specifically aimed at examining the levels of unsecured debt in South Africa. As a fellow South 
African, I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing the attached 
questionnaire. 
The questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. There is no compensation for 
responding to this questionnaire, but your response will be greatly appreciated. In order to ensure 
that all information remains confidential, please do not include your name. If you choose to 
participate in this questionnaire, please answer all questions as honestly as possible and return the 
document no later than 31 October 2014. Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. 
Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavours. 
Sincerely,  
Virushka Kanniah 
Tel: 0837803324 
Email: virushka.kanniah@gmail.com 
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Questionnaire 
Participant number: __________________________(for office use only) 
A. Demographic information 
 
1. What is your age?       Please Circle 
≤24 years 1 
25 – 29 years 2 
30 – 39 years 3 
40 – 49 years 4 
≥ 50 years 5 
 
2. Where do you live?       Please circle 
Gauteng 1 
Kwazulu-Natal 2 
Western Cape 3 
Eastern Cape 4 
Northern Cape 5 
Mpumalanga 6 
Free State 7 
North West 8 
Limpopo 9 
 
3. What is your gender?       Please circle 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
4. What is your ethnic group?     Please circle 
African 1 
Indian 2 
White 3 
Coloured 4 
Other 5 
 
5. Approximately how much to you earn every month?  Please circle 
Please note this refers to take home pay (i.e. after taxes, pension etc) 
≤R5000 1 
R5001 – R10000 2 
R10001 – R15000 3 
>R15000 4 
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B. National Credit Act (NCA)  
Please circle the most appropriate statement with 1 being strongly agree and 5 being strongly 
disagree. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. The NCA was explained to me 
when I took out any product at a 
bank or retailer. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I understand my rights as a 
consumer under the NCA. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I know who to contact should a 
bank or retailer not act in a fair 
manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I understand the term “over-
indebted” and the consequences 
it has on me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I understand that I am able to use 
the services of a debt counsellor 
should I not be able to pay back 
my debt owed to a bank or 
retailer. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I know the NCA was created to 
protect me, the consumer, from 
unfair and illegal practices by 
banks and retailers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I know that a personal loan costs 
me more than vehicle finance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I know that credit life insurance is 
not compulsory for a personal 
loan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I know that I can shop around for 
better interest rates. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I know that if I cannot pay back 
my loan, I will be listed on a 
credit bureau 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Personal Debt Information 
1. How many credit cards do you own?     Please circle 
0 1 
1-2 2 
>2 3 
 
2. What is your total amount of credit card debt?    Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R5000 2 
R5001 – R10000 3 
R10001 – R20000 4 
>R20000 5 
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3. What do you use your credit card for?     Please circle 
I do not own a credit card 1 
I use it to buy essential items like food, petrol etc 2 
I only use it when necessary like making internet purchases, air ticket purchases etc 3 
I use it to buy luxury items like brand named clothes, computer equipment etc 4 
 
4. Approximately how much is your monthly credit card instalment?  Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R1000 2 
>R1000 3 
 
5. How many personal loans do you have?     Please circle 
0 1 
1-2 2 
>2 3 
 
6. What is the total amount of your personal loan(s)?    Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R10000 2 
R10001 – R20000 3 
R20001 – R50000 4 
R50001 – R100000 5 
>R100000 6 
 
7. What did you use your personal loan(s) for?     Please circle 
I do not have a personal loan 1 
I used my personal loan to help me to pay expenses when I did not have enough 
cash to pay 
2 
I used my personal loan to make improvements on my home (building 
improvements and general caretaking of home) 
3 
I used my personal loan to buy a car 4 
I used my personal loan to consolidate all my debt in order to pay one monthly 
instalment 
5 
I used my personal loan to pay for the deposit on my house 6 
 
8. Approximately how much is your personal loan monthly instalment?  Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R1000 2 
R1001 – R5000 3 
>R5000 6 
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9. How many store cards do you own (e.g. Edgars, Truworths, etc)?  Please circle 
0 1 
1-2 2 
>2 3 
 
10. What is the total amount of store card debt that you have?   Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R5000 2 
R5001 – R10000 3 
>R10000 4 
  
11. Approximately how much is your monthly store card instalment?  Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R500 2 
R501 – R1000 3 
>R1000 4 
 
12. Do you own a house?       Please circle 
No 1 
Yes, still paying for it 2 
Yes, fully paid for 3 
 
13. Do you own a car?       Please circle 
No 1 
Yes, still paying for it 2 
Yes, fully paid for 3 
  
14. What is the total amount of your car and mortgage debt?   Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R500000 2 
R500001 – R1500000 3 
>R1500000 4 
 
15. What is the total monthly instalment on your car and mortgage debt?  Please circle 
R0 1 
R1 – R5000 2 
R5001 – R15000 3 
>R15000 4 
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16. Which payment option do you choose to pay your credit card debt   Please circle 
I do not own a credit card 1 
I pay the full outstanding balance due every month 2 
I pay the minimum monthly payment due every month 3 
I pay as much as I can pay every month 4 
I pay whenever I can, sometimes missing a months due instalment 5 
 
17. Which payment option do you choose to pay your personal loan  Please circle 
I do not have a personal loan 1 
I pay more than the minimum monthly payment due every month 2 
I pay the minimum monthly payment due every month 3 
I pay whenever I can, sometimes missing a months due instalment 4 
 
18. Which payment option do you chose to pay your store card debt?  Please circle 
I do not have a store card 1 
I pay more than the minimum monthly payment due every month 2 
I pay the minimum monthly payment due every month 3 
I pay whenever I can, sometimes missing a months due instalment 4 
  
19. Do you ever receive emails/sms’s/phone calls giving you a “pre-approved” loan? Please circle  
Yes 1 
No 2 
Unsure 3 
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Appendix 5: Tabulated results of responses to questionnaire by distinct grouping 
Table 1: Number of respondents by gender 
 Gender Number Percentage 
Female 135 61% 
Male 88 39% 
Total 223 100% 
 
Table 2: Number of respondents by geographic location 
Region Number Percentage 
Gauteng 136 61% 
Kwazulu 
Natal 82 37% 
Western cape 0 0% 
Eastern Cape 2 1% 
Northern 
Cape 0 0% 
Mpumalanga 0 0% 
Free State 2 1% 
North West 0 0% 
Limpopo 1 0% 
Total 223 100% 
 
Table 3: Number of respondents by ethnic group 
Ethnic 
Group Number Percentage 
African 78 35% 
Indian 73 33% 
White 56 25% 
Coloured 14 6% 
Other 2 1% 
Total 223 100% 
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Table 4: Number of respondents by age 
Respondents by age category 
Category Number Percentage 
≤ 24 years 30 13% 
25-29 
years 40 18% 
30-39 
years 85 38% 
40-49 
years 46 21% 
≥ 50 years 22 10% 
Total 223 100% 
 
Table 5: Number of respondents by income category 
Income category Number  Percentage 
≤ R5000 44 20% 
R5001 - R10000 38 17% 
R10001 - 
R15000 66 30% 
>R15000 75 34% 
Total 223 100% 
 
 
 
